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SUMMARY 
When the social transformation was spearheaded by the economic reforms set in place 
since 1978, the desire to alleviate the high concentration of population, employment and 
overcrowded situation of urban housing in old downtowns has triggered large-scale 
redevelopment in Chinese cities. The reshaping of landscape of Chinese cities has been 
largely driven by the fundamental institutional change. Reforms since 1978 have 
triggered profound institutional changes and economic restructuring. Old institutions 
were replaced by new ones, leading to dynamic interaction between the state and market, 
and among the various agents for land redevelopment. Based on the economical 
analyses of institutions and property rights, this study attempts to build on the existing 
knowledge of land redevelopment by answering these research questions: 1) why have 
there been institutional changes in the transitional China? 2) how do the institutions 
evolve and structure the land redevelopment in the transitional China? 3) following the 
institutional change, what patterns and processes of land redevelopment have been 
generated in transitional China? 
 
Taking Jinhuajie, Guangzhou as a case study, data are collected from field 
reconnaissance surveys, government records and interviews. A property right approach 
was used in discussing and interpreting the data. Research results reveal the continuous 
decentralization since the reforms has created the local developmental states who 
advocate land redevelopment as a mean of local growth. However， the ambition of 
local government for land redevelopment confronted with the strong rights of existing 
 V
land users who hold firmly to their land unless satisfying price was paid.  
 
During the transition, the local government initiated gradual institutional changes to 
speed up local land redevelopment and maintain land revenue in the city. Under the 
local growth coalition between the government and developers, property rights of state 
subordinated REDCs are characterized by in-kind land leasing payment with flexible 
planning control on the basis of bargaining. During this process, residents’ land use 
rights were compensated and phased out in the emerging land market. Later, de facto 
ownership is offered to SOEs in a short period to use, develop and transfer their 
occupied land to speed up redevelopment of SOE occupied land. Transitional 
institutional changes help to dispel socialist land use rights of residents and SOEs and 
make further development to be able to follow market mechanisms. As the proof, when 
socialist land use rights are phased out of the land market, the government abandons 
coalition and takes further measures for SOE reforms. For urban land, new regulations 
to forbid negotiation for land leasing made land use in Chinese cities step further into 
the socialist land market mechanisms. However, informal property rights over land 
during the transitional redevelopment process create land rents. Pursuing land rents 
results in rapid but sub-optimal redevelopment and inadequate order in the land market. 
Informal property rights push redevelopment activities but do not provide certainty to 
the market and incentives for the optimal utilization of resources. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Research 
1.1.1 Motivation 
Based on neo-classical economics, there has been an established literature on land 
redevelopment in cities in Western countries. The market is viewed as the most 
powerful institution in guiding capital circulation and society structuring. Spontaneous 
order of the behavior of private sectors which seek profit maximization in the land 
market is dominant in land redevelopment (Marcuse, 1989; Hutchinson, 1992; Parson, 
1993; Clark, 1994; Marcuse and Kempen, 2000; Henig, 1980; Williams, 1986; Marcuse, 
1989).  
 
Presently, land redevelopment in transitional socialist countries has become an 
interesting area for investigation, not only because the characteristics of transitional 
socialist economy is fundamentally different from the market economies, but also the 
special changes from a centrally-controlled urban development to a socialist market 
mechanism reveal a huge knowledge gap in the modern orthodox literature of the land 
redevelopment studies. 
 
China serves as one of the best cases for study of land redevelopment in transitional 
economies. China has attempted to achieve industrialization without a parallel growth 
of cities in the 1949-1978 period, which was in sharp contrast to conventional wisdom 
that urbanization was closely connected with industrialization (Ma, 1981; Murphey, 
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1980; Kirkby, 1985; Lin, 1994; Han and Wong, 1998). When the social transformation 
was spearheaded by the economic reforms set in place since 1978, the desire to alleviate 
the high concentration of population, employment and overcrowded situation of urban 
housing in old downtowns has triggered large-scale redevelopment in Chinese cities. The 
municipal government of Chinese cities set targets to demolish dilapidated 
neighborhoods and restructure land use in urban built areas. Highways, modernist and 
postmodernist skyscrapers have been elevated in many cities, and vast shopping malls 
and new commodity housing have been replacing old neighborhoods at a remarkable 
pace. During two decades of transition, the Chinese cities have seen an unprecedented 
change in urban restructuring (Wu & Yeh, 1997; Zhu, 1999a&b). For instance, Shanghai 
demolished 26 million m2 old houses from 1991 to 2000 (Wu, 2004). In Guangzhou, 
4481.7 hectares of land in its central areas (Dongshan, Yuexiu, Liwan and Haizhu 
Districts) has been provided into the land market for redevelopment during the period 
from 1992 to 1999 (Li, 2002). Then, what is the mechanism for land redevelopment at 
such a scale in transitional China? 
 
1.1.2 Background of this research  
The reshaping of landscape of Chinese cities has been largely driven by the fundamental 
institutional change (Zhu, 2004a). Institutions are critical for land development, as they 
define incentives and constraints for the actors in the land market (North, 1990; Guy & 
Henneberry, 2002). 
 
A planned economic system with central controls had been adopted in China since 1949 
 2
when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took governance of the country. Urban land, 
as one of the production means, was nationalized. Its use and allocation was determined 
by the central planning. Chinese cities were primed as the bases for rapid and optimum 
industrialization in the Stalinist style when priority was given to industrial development. 
Land use was thus pre-dominated by the growth of work units (Ma, 1981; Murphey, 1980; 
Kirkby, 1985; Lin, 1994). Administrative decisions based on “needs” and norms had so 
far governed the use and quantity of land consumed. Land was administratively 
transferred to the land users by the state. Neither of land rent or time limit was required, 
but the land users were not allowed to transact or transfer their rights of land use. With no 
revenues from land transfer, there was no incentive for land redevelopment. 
 
Reforms since 1978 have triggered profound institutional changes and economic 
restructuring, which generate dynamic forces to rebuild the cities (Lin, 1997; Gaubatz, 
1999; Zhu, 1999a; Zhang & Fang, 2004). Socialist market mechanisms are introduced 
to take the place of rigid central planning system. In cities, urban reform began in 1985, 
aiming at changes in central-local relationships towards power decentralization, 
government-enterprise relationships towards market orientation, and the distribution 
system towards the removal of the equalitarian practice. The Chinese Constitutions was 
amended in 1988 to introduce land use right, and housing reform was experimented and 
implemented nationwide (Bian and Logan, 1996; Chen, 1996; Chiu, 1996; Dowall, 
1993; Lau 1993, 1995; Wang and Murie, 1996; World Bank, 1992). 
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There have been enormous changes in urban restructuring and underlying processes as a 
result of the reforms. urban internal structure changed from a compact form to a more 
diffused one through polycentric and suburban developments (Lo, 1994; Wu and Yeh, 
1999), with the population of the old city core declined in the 1980s and 1990s while 
the suburban population increased (Zhou and Ma, 2000).  
 
1.1.3 Existing research 
The subject of property transaction is not the land and building per se but essentially the 
rights over them (Zhu, 2004a). Land property rights therefore matter for the 
performance of the property market (Fischel, 1985). In China, an emerging urban land 
market is structured by newly evolved property rights which are responsible for the 
phenomenon of rapid land redevelopment. Old institutions were replaced by new ones, 
leading to dynamic interaction between the state and market, and among the various 
agents for land redevelopment (Han, 2000; Zhu, 1999a&b; Wu, 1996; Zhou and Logan, 
1996). At the conjuncture of institutions and property rights, the endeavor towards a 
better understanding of China’s land redevelopment converges with the efforts of 
Western urban scholars. As Webster and Lai (2003: 54) stated, “Markets, institutions, 
property rights, organizations and spatial order evolve hand in hand. Voluntary 
exchange cannot flourish and develop into firms, markets and governments without 
rules (institutions) to assign, arbitrate and protect private property rights”. 
 
At the core of studies of the patterns and processes of China’s contemporary urban 
dynamics is a new urban development process, which includes actors with different 
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goals, ideologies, and powers, rules and regulations as well as various types of 
interactions. This new urban development process is fundamentally different from those 
under the planned economy as market has emerged as an institution for resource 
allocation, while administrative control over product distribution and exchange has 
weakened. Laws and regulations are endorsed by various governments at different 
levels, defining the formal rules for participation and interplay in the development 
process. The new roles and interests of the actors also define informal rules regulating 
their own conduct (Han and Wang, 2003). In coastal cities such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
Guangzhou, old institutions were replaced by new ones, leading to dynamic interaction 
between the state and market, and among their various agents (Han, 2000; Zhu, 
1999a&b; Wu, 1996; Zhou and Logan, 1996). 
 
Past studies on China’s urban real estate development process revealed that among the 
different actors, the state played a dominant role. Various state agencies, including 
central ministries and city governments, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), even military 
units were active participants in the real estate development activities (Ma, 2001, 
p.1562). Empirical urban development case studies about Guangzhou affirmed the role 
of danwei (i.e., work unit) in the process of housing provision (Wu 1996; Wu and Yeh 
1999). Nevertheless, economic reform brought in market mechanisms for regulating 
China’s urban development, leading to a hybrid force comprising both the state and the 
market (Han, 2000). Interactions among the various state actors such as local 
governments and SOEs, as well as their interplay with other actors such as private estate 
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developers formulated a kind of growth-coalition for the development of the built 
environment (Zhu 1999a, 1999b; Han and Wang, 2003). Formal and informal rules were 
created along with the development process. The transition of land use right, meaning 
that land users, regardless of government organizations, enterprises or individuals, could 
trade their use rights for money. Housing reform and housing privatization were also 
sped up during the last two decades, allowing private ownership of properties, an active 
role of developers and other actors (Bian and Logan, 1996; Zhou and Logan, 1996; 
Wang and Merie 1999). Particularly, the complicated transitional process of urban land 
use rights cultivated ambiguous property rights between local government and “danwei” 
(Zhu, 2002) on the one hand, and some informal and quasi-legal rules in a complex web 
of personal relationships among local authorities, land agents, and developers on the 
other (Wong and Zhao, 1999; Ma, 2001). 
1.1.4 Knowledge gap 
In spite of the rapid accumulation of research publications in the study of China’s land 
redevelopment, some theoretical issues remain highly controversial and vague. First, 
there is no theoretical framework for analyzing land redevelopment process in the 
context of China’s institutional changes. Previous research mainly described the 
redevelopment processes rather than explaining them. By placing a common emphasis 
on the role of the local state and the formation of alliances or coalitions, current analysis 
neglects the response of other social forces, such as existing land users. Interaction of 
different actors in the urban (re)development was not addressed.  
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Second, few works touched upon the changes in the institutions. China’s institutional 
changes demonstrate quite unconventional characteristics that existing research is far 
from enough. There were some pioneering works in analyzing China’s land market –the 
progress of urban land market reforms and housing commoditization were reported by 
Dowall (1993), Logan (2002) and Wang & Murie (1996). Some transitional institutions 
such as ambiguous property rights and land development rights were also identified 
(Zhu, 2002, 2004a, 2005). However, the change of transitional institutions is far from 
clarified. 
 
Third, previous research provides little insight into the evolution of institutions and land 
redevelopment patterns over times. In the transition from the centrally planned system 
to socialist market mechanisms, how the institutions, property rights over land and 
redevelopment characteristics co-evolve is still unclear.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
 
Based on the economical analyses of institutions and property rights, this study attempts 
to build on the existing knowledge of land redevelopment by providing an insight of the 
behavior of actors in land redevelopment, and to develop a theoretical framework for 
analyzing institutional transitions and their impact. Hence, this study aims to answer 
these research questions: 
1. Why have there been institutional changes in the transitional China? 
2. How do the institutions evolve and structure the land redevelopment in the 
 7
transitional China?  
3. Following the institutional change, what patterns and processes of land 
redevelopment have been generated in transitional China? 
 
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation 
The study is organized in 8 chapters, following the structure of Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 Structure of the Dissertation 
introduction
research design 
background of redevelopment: 









Institutional changes for 
land redevelopment: 
property rights analysis 
Conclusion: path-dependent 
institutional changes of land 
redevelopment during the 
transition 
Chapter 1 introduces the research problem by setting out the research background and 
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existing study of land redevelopment, identifying research objectives and questions.   
 
Chapter 2 reviews through recent theoretical literature in economical and sociological 
studies relevant to land redevelopment within a framework for this study. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the reason for case study, choice of study areas and method of data 
collection, etc. This chapter also provides the theoretical framework based on the 
literature review and the research problems. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the background for land redevelopment in transitional China. A 
series of reforms have been gradually initiated by the government in the transition 
towards a socialist market. Power of decision-making was decentralized to local 
governments by the economic reforms. Housing and urban reforms have made urban 
land a commodity and provided incentives for real estate development corporations and 
local government to develop land and pursue land revenue. Efforts to relocate industrial 
facilities were also initiated by SOE reforms. These government initiated reforms arouse 
new local land redevelopment interests, conflicting with old institutions which are 
principal in the central planning system. Due to the conflicts, institutions evolve 
gradually to generate informal property rights for land redevelopment. 
 
Chapter 5 describes the urban development of Guangzhou since the People’s 
Communist Party came into power in 1949. Both urban expansion and land 
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redevelopment in central areas have been summarized in time series. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the evolution of land redevelopment in Jinhuajie in terms of 
redevelopment characteristics which include rapid large-scale urban redevelopment 
under the “local developmental state”, evolution of the redevelopment types and 
flexible planning control. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the nature of property rights evolution. The path-dependent 
evolution was structured by some key transitional institutions that prevailed during the 
transition to provide incentives for collaboration among different actors to redevelop 
urban land. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes the study by summarizing the research findings, its implications 
for existing research work and future research work.  
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 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction: Framework of Literature Review 
This chapter provides a fundamental discussion of the theoretical background for the 
understanding of urban redevelopment in the transitional economy with emphasis on the 
property rights.  
 
Urban redevelopment is a comprehensive process involving various actors with 
different interests and resources, different development stages and various forces 
shaping urban development. To get insight of the shaping force of urban redevelopment, 
this research first reviews the traditional economic theories for land development 
process. As such theories could not descript and explain the frequent interactions among 
the actors, the land market, institutional analysis is reviewed to incorporate land and 
property market. Drawn from new-institutional economics, new-institutional approach 
has been applied to urban and real estate market analysis and offer a good method to 
study land markets from the perspective of institutions. In the context of institutions, 
actors, especially the state has been highlighted in this review. Sociological analyses of 
“urban regime” and “growth coalition” in the Western countries and “developmental 
state” in East Asia indicate the state’s regulation in the land market. Similarly, all these 
paradigms have been deployed to explain the urban restructuring in transitional China. 
As one of the key component of institutional economics, property rights are reviewed 
and its importance in structuring the urban development and redevelopment behaviors is 
revealed.  
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 This chapter is structured in the following framework (see Figure 2.1). 
 
 







the land market 
Analysis of land redevelopment in 
the transitional China 
Highlight: role 




Study of land market of 
transitional China 
Basic Analysis of 
Institutions & 
Institutional Change 




Approach in Urban Analysis 
Urban Development as a Comprehensive Process 
Figure 2.1 Framework of Literature Review 
2.2 Urban Development as a Comprehensive Process 
Urban development is always regarded as a comprehensive process, and academic 
literature has stressed in recent years the importance of understanding the strategies and 
interests of ‘actors’ and their relationship in the development process (Healey and 
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Barrett, 1990; Healey, 1991). 
 
The development process is defined as both a physical and a social process. It not only 
recognizes the physically chronological character, it also embraces a variety of agencies, 
agency relations, activities and events involved in development project. It is the 
“process by which land changes from one state of development and use to another in 
response to changing needs and demands for space and buildings” (Barret and Whiting, 
1983). The development process is also the process of “transformation of the physical 
form, bundles of rights, and material and symbolic value of land and building from one 
state to another, through the effort of agents with interests and purposes in acquiring and 
using resources, operating rules and applying and developing ideas and values” (Healey, 
1992: 36). It has thus been studied in terms of strategies, interests and actions of the 
various actors involved in the development process (Healey and Barret, 1990; Rudel, 
1989), development stages (Barret et al 1978; Barret and Whiting 1983; Cadman and 
Rosalyn 1995), different forces in shaping urban development (Hawley 1950; Berry and 
Kasarda 1977; Stone 1989; Molotch 1992). 
2.2.1 Actors  
Urban development process is shaped by the behavior of different actors. Knox and Pinch (2000: 
167) identified: building provision is “a function of social relations specific to time – and place – 
that involve a variety of key actors (including land owners, investors, financiers, developers, builders, 
design professionals, construction workers, business and community leaders, and consumers). At the 
same time, the state – both local and national – must be recognized as an important agent in its own 
right and as a regulator of competition between various actors”. It is also argued by Pahl (1969) that 
the property focus of urban research should be the interplay of spatial and social constraints that 
determine opportunities of access to urban resources. He also points out that activities, policies and 
ideologies of the managers or controllers of the urban system are of great importance in understating 
the social constraints. As the managers of scare resources are grouped to different spheres, decision 
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making of each group thus becomes the source of socio-spatial differentiation (Knox and Pinch, 
2000).  
2.2.2 Events and Stages 
Different events and stages are involved in the physical development process that form 
the path a project might take chronologically (Barret and Whiting, 1983). Development 
process is regarded as complicated, and can be divided to several steps: initiation; 
evaluation; acquisition; design and costing; permissions; commitment; implementation; 
let/manage/dispose (Cadman & Austin-Crowe, 1991). 
 
As the most straightforward depiction of the development process, Cadman and 
Austin-Crowe’s (1978) four-phase sequence of evaluation, preparation, implementation, 
and disposal is rough but clear. Trying to capture both the cyclical nature and the 
diversity of the development process, Barrett et al (1978) transform the linear model 
into a cyclical form, by devising their ‘development-pipeline’ model (see Figure 2.2). 
Based on the assumption of substantial diversity of actor-event relations, Barrett 
proposed analysis through a loosely structured event sequence in which events were 
recognized to be able to occur in parallel as well as in sequence. The whole 
development process was set within the broader context of demographic, economic and 
political change. 
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 Figure 2.2 the Development-pipeline Model   (Barrett et al. 1978) 
2.2.3 Driving Forces 
Urban development process is also recorded to be shaped by various driving forces. A 
large body of literature on the evolution of urban development follows the two strands – 
technological tradition and the political economic tradition. 
 
According to Dewey’s review, the technological approach accentuates market trends 
that result from technological changes such as the construction of highways or 
communication systems. The highways change the value of land by reducing 
commuting time between a central city and outlying areas. These theorists including 
Rudel (1989), Hawley (1950), Berry and Kasarda (1977), who argued that trends in the 
market produced trends in regulation over time.  
 
Political economic approach attempts to incorporate political inequalities and conflict 
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into explanations of property development. Detailed case studies have been provided to 
reveal how political economic processes have shaped urban development in particular 
cities. For example, by making generous campaign contributions, wealthy elites can 
influence the land-use process, and shape land-use patterns to their own ends. Some 
researchers in this tradition apply Marxist theory to processes of urban development 
(Castells, 1983; Harvey, 1978). Analyses of land use control and planning also present 
how political economic processes structure urban development in particular areas 
(Dorothy, 1997).  
 
2.3 Traditional Analysis of the Development Process 
For a long time, economists, sociologists and planners have tried to give a reasonable 
explanation to the development process by developing all kinds of models. Traditional 
approaches to the analysis of urban development can be divided into two strands: 
neo-classical and Marxist approaches. Both approaches are functionalist in nature with 
an emphasis on the supply-demand relationships. Neoclassical approach assumes that 
only rationally acting individual actors operate on the market. Price adjustments, mainly 
through the demand side conditions, will automatically lead to an equilibrium. Marxists 
approaches take the view that the market is based on the possession of capital: 
supply-demand relations are defined by the contrast between labour and capital. 
 
2.3.1 Analysis of urban redevelopment in neo-classical economics & Neo-classical 
models 
Markets are usually regarded as a good way to organize economic activities (Mankiw, 
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2001) which include the development of urban built environment. According to the 
neo-classical economics, markets are operated through the “invisible hand” (Smith, 
1776). Individuals behave rationally in maximizing utilities with preference, and 
relative prices drive the market moving toward a long-run equilibrium. Free competition 
directs economic activities through prices which reflect demand and supply situations. 
For an efficient market, there are three fundamental conditions: maximum utilities, 
rational behavior and equilibrium (reference). Being assumed to behave rationally, 
individuals orient their decisions and contract with each other according to price signals, 
seeking and being able to seek the maximum utility and margin in their own self-interest 
(Marshall, 1920). In this way, mutual benefit is reached through the self-regarding 
contracting process. Institutions and organizations are regarded as of fiddling 
importance, human behaviors in the transaction process are filtrated as pure operation of 
price mechanism and competition. The operation of the market is thus assumed having 
no friction or transaction cost. Any real market is considered a sub-optimal deviation 
from the neo-classical ideal. 
 
Derived from the neo-classical tradition in economics, these models assume sufficient 
supply should be brought forward to meet demand, “at the right place, the right time and 
the right price”. Researchers in this field sought to assess efficiency or equity with 
which the land market operated within a given political economy, assuming perfect 
market conditions and rational behavior on the part of market actors (Healey and Barrett, 
1990; Harvey, 1982; Fraser, 1984).  
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Based on the neo-classical economics, there has been an established literature on urban 
redevelopment in Western cities. Five main categories of redevelopment determinants 
are identified in a broad literature review. Relevant are the critical influences of 
production (Marcuse, 1989; Hutchinson, 1992; Parson, 1993; Clark, 1994), real estate, 
displacement of social classes as part of board socio-spatial restructuring in central 
cities (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000; Henig, 1980; Williams, 1986; Marcuse, 1989; 
Clark, 1994), demography, and policy. Spontaneous order of the behavior of private 
sectors in the land market is dominant in urban redevelopment. The market is believed 
to be able to adapt to changes in demand and supply without central planning (Hayek, 
1944; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Witt, 1991). In a city, this means the markets ability to 
respond to changes in resource value, including urban land (Webster & Lai, 2003). 
There are also a small number of urban researches which focused on land and property 
markets by examining the issue of property-led urban regeneration (Carbonardo and 
D’Archy, 1993; Jones, 1996). They argued that by enhancing the supply side conditions 
of urban system it was possible for new development to be stimulated and generally for 
economic growth to be generated.  
 
Giving insufficient analytical attention to the difference between occupier (user) and 
investment demand, providing no means for examining the methods used by agents 
within the development process, such equilibrium models are quantitative methods 
which seldom think about social aspects of those involved in development and 
uncertainty. They are only helpful in understanding the development process for 
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standard types of project in relatively stable conditions where active property markets 
exist, which are not dominated by a few large operators. 
 
2.3.2 Marxism structure models 
The Marxian literature shifts from the neo-classical preoccupation with the formation of 
prices in markets to an interest in the way markets are structured through the power 
relations of capital, labors and landowner (Healey, 1991). Mostly concerned with the 
production of commodities under capitalist social relations, Marxian studies emphasize 
the questions of urbanization, the provision of housing and infrastructure. The focus has 
been the struggles between landowners and capitalist producers over the capture of 
‘surplus value’ generated in production, in order to locate the processes of production 
within a general model of a capitalist economy. These researches explain the social 
relations attached to construction and development as well as the role property plays in 
the accumulation of capital (Luithlen, 1997), emphasizing the way how markets are 
structured through the power relations. For the analysis of property development 
process, the literature focuses on the ways in which capital flows into and out of 
different sectors of the economy (Harvey, 1982, 1989; Ball, 1983; Ambrose, 1986). 
 
One famous model for property development is addressed by Boddy (1981) from 
Marxist economics. Three ‘circuits of capital’ are distinguished. In the first, ‘industrial 
capital’, surplus is generated by the production of commodities. In the ‘commercial 
capital’, it is generated by the purchase and sale of commodities and in ‘interest-bearing 
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capital’, surplus is generated by the purchase and sale of money capital. Development 
process is thus structured by the dynamics of these three circuits and the tensions 
between them. Harvey (1985) also developed a new model in purely capital flow 
function to eliminate the influence of variable human behavior (see Figure 2.3). Fixed 
capital and consumption fund, as two spheres of investment, are detected. The final 
result of the operation of this circuit is the creation and modification of the physical 
environment within which all economic and social activity may proceed. 
 
Figure 2.3 the Built Environment in the Structure of Relations between Primary, 
Secondary and Tertiary Circuits of Capital  (Harvey, 1985) 
Base on Harvey’s study, Ambrose (1986) first builds up a development system (see 
Figure 2.4) to provide an overall context. Made up of 3 main ‘fields’ — the finance 
industry, the state, and the construction industry, the development system sets out the 
principal relationships among the 3 main ‘fields’ or sets of agents and between the 
agents themselves.  
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 Figure 2.4 the Development System in the United Kingdom (Ambrose, 1986) 
However, this approach is not fit for land market study. It is clear that land cannot be 
conceived as a commodity that is produced by human effort for the purpose of exchange 
value, and neither can location. However, there is a merit in this approach that at least 
the work on land, which means the development of property can be identified and be 
placed into the broader context of accumulation (Massey and Catalano, 1978). 
2.3.3 Characteristics of the land market 
The reality is that the essential assumptions underlying a perfect free market rarely 
apply, especially to the land market. The fact that both land and property developed on 
it can be transferred on an open market, does not make for an efficient market.  
 
First of all, land supply is limited. Also, both land and property are fixed to one location 
and investment in them requires large capital outlays. The concept of land implies a host 
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of external effects, positive as well as negative. All these attributes make for a very 
imperfect market. Moreover, both land and property on it are long-lasting assets and the 
value to the user is dependent on many factors which occur outside the plot and are thus 
beyond the control of the owner or investor (Luithlen, 1997). Just as the example given 
by Webster and Lai (2003), if a home purchaser transacts with a vendor for a set of 
well-delineated rights over the home and the land on which it stands, the price paid 
reflects the buyer’s valuation of many neighborhood attributes which are implicitly 
bundled in by which are not subject to formal contract. Combined with the complexity 
attached to land, the land market is bound to be highly speculative and unpredictable 
compared with other markets. The neoclassical analysis is thus at pains in charting 
theoretically the process of change in the land market and its underlying dynamics. 
There rises a requirement for drawing on the vary insights of the market. 
 
Situations become even complicated for urban redevelopment in a city as more actors 
are involved in the urban redevelopment process. With the high density of population 
and social activities in central cities, social affairs such as social equity and social 
structure are not evasive for the manager of the society – the state when urban renewal 
takes place. The physical environment is the tip of an iceberg with much that is hidden 
beneath the surface which includes changes of economy, social structure and political 
environment. Generally，based on the market situation, a social system will regulate the 
distribution of resources so as to achieve its political and economical purposes. Frequent 
intervention from the state brings the land market of urban redevelopment even far 
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away from the “perfect market” (Guy and Henneberry, 2002). 
 
Moreover, many valued resources are not allocated by markets in a city, giving rise to 
market failure which includes externality and public goods (Pigou, 1932; Coase, 1960; 
Arrow, 1970; Webster & Lai, 2003). Externality and public goods problems are endemic 
in society but particularly in cities where many different types of actors interact in close 
proximity (Pigou, 1932; Webster & Lai, 2003). Externalities and public goods cause 
distortions in the allocation of resources because of the absence of accurate information 
about how they are valued. The market oversupplies goods that yield third party costs 
and undersupplies or fails to supply goods that yield third party benefits. The idea of 
market failure actually implies the existence of a perfect market which only exists in 
theory and not in reality (Webster & Lai, 2003).  
 
The inability of markets to deliver certain kinds of goods and services is the assumption 
underlying many government functions (Webster & Lai, 2003). Spontaneous markets 
require responsive governments to create legal environments that support innovation, 
competition and wealth accumulation (Webster & Lai, 2003). As the regulator, state and 
its agencies have an important role in the development through passing and enforcing 
laws, levying taxes, administering regulations, giving subsides, building and 
maintaining infrastructure, providing services, settling disputes, and buying and selling 
land (Rudel, 1989). Governments therefore seek to regulate production and exchanges 
that yield social costs and provide services that might not otherwise be insufficient 
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supply. Planning for infrastructure, services and utilities is carried out to solve the 
“market failure” problems in the land market. Due to the market failure, transactions in 
the land market are always mediated by the “visible hand” instead of being solely 
governed by the “invisible hand”. That’s why studies of urban development and 
redevelopment in recent years have been focused on the institutional ensembles and 
regulatory mechanism (Lin, 2002). 
 
2.4 The Institutional Economics Approach in Urban Analysis 
For seven decades (1930-2000), studies of new institutional economics have obtained 
quiet great progress in the analysis of human behaviors, most of which are based on the 
criticism and amend of unpractical assumption of traditional economics. It mainly 
focuses on relationship among property rights, transaction costs, institutions and 
economic behaviors. While the neo-classical economics assumes human behaviors to be 
rational (Machina, 1987; Winter, 1986), new institutional economics takes a more 
practical view towards the human behaviors: individual actors always confront with 
nonrepetitive choices where the information is incomplete and where outcomes are 
uncertain. For a review of the economic theory of property rights readers are referred to 
seminal contributions by Coase (1937, 1960), Alchian (1967, 1972), Demsetz (1967), 
Cheung (1969) and Pejovich (1990).  
2.4.1 Basic Analysis of Institutions & Institutional Change 
The institutionalist approach provides a theory of social dynamics. Voluntary exchange 
cannot flourish and develop into firms, markets and governments without institutions to 
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assign, arbitrate and protect private property rights (Webster & Lai, 2003). Rules and 
procedures evolved simplify the process of individuals to process, organize, and utilize 
information. The consequent institutional framework, by structuring human interaction, 
limits the choice set of the actors and reduce the uncertainties involved in human 
interaction (North, 1990). 
2.4.1.1 Institutions  
North (North 1990: 3-4) conceptualized institutions as “the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction…. In the jargon of the economist, institutions define and limit the set of 
choices of individuals”. Institutions affect the performance of the economy by their 
effect on the costs of exchange and production. Institutions determine the cost of 
transacting and producing (transformation) and in the meantime, define and enforce 
property rights so as to induce potentially mutually beneficial resource uses and activity. 
It has been proved when transaction costs are significant, institutions matter (Coase, 
1960; Alchian, 1977; Demsetz, 1967; Barzel, 1997). “A set of political and economic 
institutions that provide low-cost transacting makes possible the efficient factor and 
product markets underlying economic growth” (North, 1992: 6). Similarly, a bad choice 
of institutional arrangements is likely to have different economic consequences.  
 
There are two types of game rules: formal ones and informal ones, while institutions 
also include the enforcement characteristics of both. In short, they consist of the 
structure that humans impose on their dealings with each other (North, 1992). Formal 
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constraints are the rules that human beings devise such as constitutional, property-rights 
rules, and contracts. Informal ones include conventions and codes of behavior such as 
norms and customs. Informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies (Aoki, 2001), setting the way 
by which the mind processes information and informal constraints thus play an 
important role in the makeup of the choice both in the short-run and in the long-run 
evolution of societies (North, 1990).  
 
However, formal rules can complement and increase the effectiveness of informal 
constraints by lower information, monitoring, and enforcement costs and hence make 
informal constraints possible solutions to more complex exchange. They can also be 
enacted to modify, revise, or replace informal constraints. The increasing complexity of 
societies would naturally raise the rate of return to the formalization of constraints and 
technological change tended to lower measurement costs. The creation of formal legal 
systems to handle more complex disputes entails formal rules; hierarchies that evolve 
with more complex organization entail formal structures to specify principal/ agent 
relationships (North, 1990). Formal rules include political rules, economic rules, and 
contracts. Problems of information—related to the possibility of opportunistic behavior 
of one of the agents—make it necessary to draw up contracts and define property rights 
(Hodgson, 1988). Political rules interact with economic rules which define economic 
policy and then specify a bundle of property rights over the use and rights to derive 
income from property within the contract that enable the exchange to occur in a human 
 26
interaction. The efficiency of the political market is the key to the efficiency of property 
rights. If political transaction costs are low and the political actors have accurate models 
to guide them, then efficient property rights will emerge. But high transaction costs of 
political markets and subjective perceptions of the actors more often have resulted in 
property rights that do not induce economic growth, and the consequent organizations 
may have no incentive to create productive economic rules (North, 1990). 
2.4.1.2 Institutional change and path dependence 
 
Here comes the question: what determines the divergent patterns of evolution of 
societies, polities, or economies over time? North (1990) concluded: history matters. 
“The consequence of small events and chance circumstances can determine solutions 
that, once they prevail, lead one to a particular path” (North, 1990: 94), featuring not 
necessarily the most optimal solution. A “path” is an identifiable pattern of constraints 
and incentives which generate strategies, routines and shared decision rules through 
operation in a given institutional system (Hall, 1986). Path dependence occurs because 
of increasing returns to scale and imperfect markets characterized by significant 
transaction cost (North, 1990). A path dependent historical or temporal process is one 
characterized by a self-reinforcing mechanisms or realization of increasing returns in 
moving along this path (Arthur, 1994; North, 1990). 
 
The notion of path dependency suggests that lock-in effects and sub-optimal behavior 
may persist (Arthur, 1994; David, 1994). Path dependence constitutes a particular kind 
of historical process with a number of distinctive characteristics (Pierson, 2000; 
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Mahoney, 2000). First, small events early in the sequence could have disproportionately 
large effects on later events and events trigger a move toward a particular path. Second, 
during the early stages of a sequence, increasing returns or self-reinforcing mechanisms 
reinforce the movement along one path. Over time organizations/actors operating within 
the institutions that define a particular path become more adept and knowledgeable and 
use this to enhance the efficiency of the institutions. Third, previously viable options 
may be foreclosed in the aftermath of a sustained period of positive feedback, and the 
path came to an end when new events dislodge the long-lasting equilibrium. In addition, 
Mahoney (2000) and Pierson (2000) also point out that outside of the marketplace, other 
mechanism, namely the exercise of “political authority” or “power” in favor of a 
particular path, would induce further movement along as powerful actors can affect 
institutions or rules. 
2.4.2 Economic theory of property rights 
2.4.2.1 Definition of property rights 
 
Generally, property rights are explained as the bundle of rights to use and dispose of an 
economic resource and to derive utility (income) from it. According to the Roman law 
which specifies several categories of property rights, ownership rights consist of the 
right to use assets (usus), the right to capture benefits from assets (usus fructus), the 
right to change its form and substance (abusus), and the right to transfer all or some of 
the rights specified above to others at a price mutually agreed upon (Pejovich, 1990: 
27-28). In one introduction of the economic significance of property rights, Pejovich 
(1997: 3) explains: “property rights are relations among individuals that arise from the 
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existence of scarce goods and that pertain to their uses. … That is, property rights do not 
define the relationship between individuals and objects. Instead, they define the 
relationship among individuals with respect to all scarce goods.”  
 
2.4.2.2 Property rights and transaction costs 
 
Transaction costs are usually defined as the costs of all resources required to transfer 
property rights from one economic agent to another. Transaction costs include the costs 
of making an exchange (for instance, discovering exchange opportunities, negotiating 
exchange, monitoring, and enforcement) and the costs of maintaining and protecting the 
institutional structure (for instance, judiciary, police, armed forces) (Pejovich, 1997). 
Only when transaction cost is zero, an efficient allocation of resources can be 
independent of the initial assignment of property rights (Alchian, 1977). However, it is 
always costly to transact. Any transfer occurs with exchange entail costs that result from 
both parties attempting to determine what the valued attributes of these assets are (North, 
1990). Transactions only occur when the increased utility it brings is larger that the 
transaction costs that its operation needs. Transaction costs arise because of difficulties 
of communication, information collation and ambiguities of entitlements or rights. If 
information is not complete or not perfectly distributed, transaction costs are not 
therefore zero, and the outcome for any externality problem will depend on the 
distribution of property rights (Lai & Yu, 2002). Property rights thus matter. As the 
transaction costs are always positive, if an alternative form of economic organization 
could achieve the same or even greater value of production at less cost than would be 
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incurred by using the market, it will be chosen. 
 
Transaction costs are saved when owners of labor, land and capital resources pool 
property rights and submit to planned economic co-operation (Webster & Lai, 2003). In 
firms and governments, the rearrangement of activities and rights would not be decided 
by contract but as a result of an administrative decision as to how the rights should be 
used. Especially for the government, it is able to avoid market altogether if it wishes 
(Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967). In another word, transactions are replaced by systems of 
rules in this situation. However, at some point the costs of organizing production may 
become too costly to maintain – taking account of the costs of perverse responses to 
rules as well as the costs of administering and policing rules – then an organization 
becomes inefficient (Coase, 1937; Webster & Lai, 2003). In a city, the costs of a 
government program or policy can exceed the benefits delivered. Property rights, 
organizations, institutions and transaction costs thus reorganize (Webster & Lai, 2003). 
 
2.4.2.3 Property rights and human behaviors 
 
Clearly defined private property fights are an essential requirement for resolving the 
conflict of interest among individuals via market exchange (Alchian, 1977). In markets, 
individuals contract to exchange property rights with others in pursuit of maximized 
utility, and mutual benefit is reached through this self-regarding contracting process 
which is explained as ‘invisible hand’. However, this is so to the extent that all 
resources that have a value also have a price (Webster and Lai, 2003). 
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 Following the definition of property rights, the right of ownership contains three 
elements: exclusivity of ownership, transferability of ownership, and constitutional 
guarantees of ownership (Pejovich, 1997). By internalizing the costs of a decision, the 
exclusivity of ownership creates strong incentives for owners to seek the highest utility 
from their property. Transferability of ownership provides incentives for resource to be 
transferred from a less optimistic to a more optimistic owner. Meanwhile, the 
constitutional guarantees of ownership create incentives for individuals to accumulate 
wealth via investments that have long-run consequences. All these attributes build the 
responsibility of the owner (Alchian, 1977) and change of situation of attributes will 
certainly affect the owner(s) behavior. 
 
In the economic point of view, efficiency of a property rights structure depends on 
whether it can guide incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities 
(Demsetz, 1967). Generally, an increase of communality of property, which is often 
expressed as the increase in the number of owners, leads to increase of the cost to 
internalize. Three categories of property rights have been divided: private ownership, 
communal ownership, and public (state) ownership (Demsetz, 1967). Under public 
community rights the consequences of any decision are less fully thrust upon the 
decision maker and make some resources appear to be used wastefully or 
inappropriately. For example, with communal ownership1, all the members share the 
                                                        
1 According to Pejovich (1997), communal ownership means that a well-defined group of people jointly hold a 
nontransferable asset. Ordinarily, members of the group have the right to decide how to use the asset and the right to 
allocate proceeds. But they have no right to sell those rights to others. 
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rights. When one pursues individual maximum utility, part of the cost may become the 
liability of other members. Correspondingly, no one can exclude other members from 
sharing the gain of his effort. Negotiation cost among membesr may be too high 
because of the large number of interacting parties. Since it is only through membership 
in the group that an individual can capture some benefits from resources held in 
common, communal ownership creates a bias against decisions that have long-term 
consequences. All these lead to great externality. In the situation of state ownership, 
only part of the rights can be officiated by the deputies appointed by the state when 
using and transferring resources and allocating gains. This reduces their incentives to 
pursue great economic efficiency and surveille others. Comparing to them, private 
ownership offers much clearer rights and responsibility to the owner. The single owner 
will attempt to maximize the right’s value by taking into account alternative future time 
streams of benefits and costs. In effect, many externalities existing with state and 
communal ownership are now internalized with the private ownership and led to 
incentives to use the resource more efficiently. 
 
Barzel (1997) views property rights and resources as having multiple attributes. The 
degree to which ownership is established over a commodity’s separate attributes 
depends on the cost of creating and policing contracts that establish that ownership. 
Attributes to which rights are not assigned by formal or informal contract are in the 
public domain2 and subject to competition (Webster & Lai, 2003). The way to check to 
                                                        
2 According to Barzel (1997), public domain means the domain (spatially or otherwise defined) 
within which competition occurs in the consumption of resource attributes. 
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what degree ownership is established is to see how many rights attributes have been 
well defined through formal or informal contracts. Which attributes are left in or 
removed out the public domain depends on the attributes value and the cost of assigning 
property rights over the attributes – transaction costs. As both are changing 
unremittingly, there will always be a demand for reallocation of property rights. If it is 
too costly to establish property rights over every attribute of a good or resource, some 
will inevitably be left in the public domain (Barzel, 1997; Webster & Lai, 2003).  
 
In the absence of clearly assigned rights, resource attributes left in the public domain are 
likely to be dissipated due to the resource expended in capturing or protecting them 
from overusing. However, public domain goods and services tend to congest in cities, 
resulting in dynamic realignment of property rights over time (Webster & Lai, 2003). A 
responsive local government will be required to find out ways to assigning the right 
more efficiently. One principle given by Barzel (1997) is: rights to a resource should be 
assigned to those in the strongest position to influence the resource’s contribution to the 
desired outcome. Especially in the case of collective action problems, rights over the 
various resource attributes involved should be assigned to those who have the greatest 
ability to influence the way those resource attributes contribute to externality reduction. 
In the same vein, Barzel (1997) suggests the assignment of policy or legal jurisdiction to 
the level of government most able to deliver a particular government function 
effectively in pursuit of accepted goals. 
 
Property rights approach offers a more dynamic analysis of urban markets and of the 
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scope and requirement for intervention. If property rights are understood to be a 
function of resource value and the transaction costs of excluding others, then the 
boundaries of the public domain will be constantly shifting and property rights over 
goods will be constantly reordering (Webster & Lai, 2003). 
 
2.4.2.4 Property rights and market failure 
 
An understanding of property rights is crucial to the analysis of market failure. With the 
property rights theory, externality and public goods problems may be understood to be 
problems of undeveloped markets or more generally underdeveloped institutions. 
Market failure problems arise “when resources have a value, but are ill-defined in terms 
of property rights and as a result of proprietary ambiguity, remain unpriced and 
inefficiently allocated” (Webster & Lai, 2003: 99). Without clearly defined property 
rights, a transaction will influence the third party whose costs are not able to be taken 
into account in the transaction. With the same reason, some resources are left in the 
public domain and are collectively consumed, which leads to dissipation of the resource. 
The solution to a market failure problem is to assign property rights, and the efficiency 
of any particular solution depends on the transaction costs saved less the cost of creating 
institutions that create the property rights (Barzel, 1997; Webster & Lai, 2003).  
 
It is more useful to compare the efficiency of externality situations under alternative 
property rights distributions than to compare any particular externality problem with an 
ideal model of the perfect market (Webster & Lai, 2003). A wide choice of institutions 
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may emerge to assign property rights in the face of market failure problems in cities. 
They may emerge voluntarily or by government imposition and the efficiency of 
institutions will depend on the costs of creating and maintaining it and the benefits to 
reduce property rights ambiguity (Hirschman, 1970; Barzel, 1997).  
2.4.3 Analysis of Actors 
Revealed in New Institutional Economics analysis, study of the behavior of actors 
should be placed in the centre of the analysis of building provision. Knox and Pinch 
(2000: 167) identified: building provision is “a function of social relations specific to 
time – and place – that involve a variety of key actors (including land owners, investors, 
financiers, developers, builders, design professionals, construction workers, business 
and community leaders, and consumers). At the same time, the state – both local and 
national – must be recognized as an important agent in its own right and as a regulator 
of competition between various actors”. It is also argued by Pahl (1969) that the 
property focus of urban research should be the interplay of spatial and social constraints 
that determine opportunities of access to urban resources. He also points out that 
activities, policies and ideologies of the managers or controllers of the urban system are 
of great importance in understating the social constraints. As the managers of scare 
resources are grouped to different spheres, decision making of each group thus becomes 
the source of socio-spatial differentiation (Knox and Pinch, 2000). Institutions for 
building supply shape not only actors’ opportunities but also their sense of possibilities. 
 
Aiming at penetrating into the detail of agency relationships in the negotiation of 
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development projects and offering ways of generalizing behavior of actors and the 
significance of events in the development process under different conditions, the 
institutional emphasis in the analysis of development activity uncovers a varied array of 
actors and interests who play diverse roles in relation to various elements of the 
development process (Gore and Nicholson, 1991).  
 
Emphasizing on class relations and social differentiation, Max Weber (1947) centers his 
analysis on an ‘action frame of reference’ which puts ‘man as the actor’ as the centre 
and seeks to explain social systems in terms of the behavior of people. Later, scholars 
propose descriptive institutional models of the development process which take account 
of the complexity of the events and agencies involved in the process and the diversity of 
forms that the process may take under different conditions (Healy and Barret, 1990; 
Healey, 1994; Ball, 1986, 1998). Three main themes are central to this approach: (1) the 
identification of agents and institutions, their different goals, ideologies and relative 
power in the urban development process; (2) the nature of interactions among agents 
and institutions and the kinds of constraints they impose on each other; (3) the effect of 
these interactions on the development process. 
 
Various actors have been identified including “the original landowner or any subsequent 
purchaser of the land; the developer who undertakes the process; the building industry, 
including the professions connected with it; the legal profession; the public authorities; 
the person lending money; the ultimate consumer who may be a tenant or owner of the 
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finished development”(Lichfield, 1956: 4). Drewett (1973) captures the developer’s 
action approach without time dimension in his model. Two behavioral models were 
developed to characterize the roles of different actors involved in the development 
process (Bryan et al, 1982; Barrett & Whitting, 1983). Bryan et al (1982) regard actors 
as independent, with the ability to make the decisions and to take actions in their own 
interests and conclude that the decisions and events of process relate to the actors who 
are responsible or whose roles involved at each stage. Barrett and Whitting (1983) 
characterize development activity by an interactive approach. The development process 
is thus made up of a series of interactions and transactions between the various actors 
involved.  
 
Of particular interest of the scholars are the role of developers and state. Developers 
have often been regarded as the key players in development process (Clawson, 1971; 
Maclaran, 1993). It is the developers who initiate the development process – by 
recognizing an opportunity to profit from a perceived demand for certain types of 
building in particular locations (see Figure 2.5). Developers are connected to financial 
institutions, governing bodies, the communities in which they build, space users, and a 
range of vendors and undertake the entrepreneurial role of uncertainty bearing (Harvey, 
1982). As the regulator, state always plays an important role in the development process. 
Its role is highlighted in next section. 
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 Fig 2.5 Major Private-sector Relations within the Property Development Industry 
(Maclaran, 1993) 
Healey (1992) and Healey & Barret (1990) called for the use of a structure-agency 
institutional model in order to generalize the nexus of the actors and relationships 
involved in the property development process. In this model, institutional rules govern 
how resources are used and are set by the institution or the political process. Healey 
tries to focus on distinguishing levels of analysis. A four-level process is introduced. 
First, a mapping exercise is undertaken for describing what happens in the development 
process. Second, a rational analysis is made to identify the agencies involved in the 
process—their roles and power relations. Third, the strategies and interests of 
significant actors are analyzed and related to the structural resources, rules and ideas. 
The fourth level is to theorize the nature of mode of production and regulation, on the 
basis of the empirical findings. Based on British cases, Healey focuses on roles in both 
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production by using the elements of a production process and consumption by the 
‘products’ in the development process. Healey’s series of papers (see Healey, 1991, 
1992, 1994, 1995, 1998) demonstrated the potential for obtaining new insights into 
development by adopting and adapting a range of approaches used by researchers from 
outside the property field: mainly geographers, economists, planners and sociologists. 
However, such analyses are not subject to much theoretical challenge or empirical 
testing (Hooper, 1992) and fail to offer any deep insight into the mechanisms of market 
capitalism, or to identify in any detail how the economic process frames the local 
development practice (Guy and Hennebery, 2000). 
 
Ball (1983; 1986; 1998) argued that the structure of provision (SOP) model reconnects 
agency and structure, organizations and markets, in a dynamic, contextual analysis (Guy 
and Henneberry, 2000). According to Ball, `provision’ encompasses the whole gamut of 
development, construction, ownership，use and even health care, etc. Such ‘provision’ is 
structured by the network of organizations and markets involved in a particular form. 
Organizations and markets were both parts of the structure of provision, with two-way 
influences on each other. Meanwhile, contingent contexts are at the core of the SOP 
approach. Defining what a SOP is has to be treated in the same empirical specific way. 
According to Ball himself, SOP is only a conceptual device for incorporating 
institutions into analyses of the development process. The provision thesis provides a 
perspective for empirical research rather than a theory of explanation (Ball, 1998).  
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2.4.4 Highlight: Study of the Role of the Local Government in the Land Market 
It is argued by Pahl (1969) that the property focus of urban research should be the 
interplay of spatial and social constraints that determine opportunities of access to urban 
resources. At the scale of city, the government always plays the role of controller of 
rights. In fact, the government’s role in shaping an institutional structure for the market 
in urban physical development is widely considered both essential and crucial. The 
important role of government could be revealed by the approach of property rights. 
2.4.4.1 Property rights and government 
 
At a system level, the market economy is demonstrably superior to a centrally planned 
economy as the market is more efficient than the plan in allocating goods. It is because 
the market is based on the system of private property rights and the rule of law which 
allows the maximum possible degree of individual liberty subject to certain prohibitions 
that are necessary for collective existence (Aoki, 2001; Webster & Lai, 2003).  
 
However, society will demand planning in situations where the transaction costs of 
using the market are greater than using commands (Webster & Lai, 2003). Market 
failure requires the government to assign property rights in the political market. 
However, not all the government interventions could succeed in delivering acceptable 
distributions of benefits in the market. Some policies are successful as they protect 
property rights, preserve private benefits, and also deliver broadly acceptable 
constraints on private action (Barzel, 1997; Webster & Lai, 2003). In other cases, 
government inefficiency leads to the inability of the state to tackle market failures and 
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its ability to exacerbate them; the tendency of the state to create market distortions, etc.   
 
However, some other policies that yield economic ‘rent’ to groups that hold power 
would also succeed (Webster & Lai, 2003). Rent-seeking and principal-agent problems 
are closely related to the latter type (Tollison, 1982; Grossman & Hart, 1983). There is 
an economic tendency for all interest groups to promote their interest at the expense of 
others if the costs will not harm the groups’ economic interest in the foreseeable future 
(Tollison, 1982). The very nature of government and its various arms as a non-price 
distributor of property rights in cities makes it vulnerable to rent-seeking activity. 
Rent-seeking group use their position to create artificial income for themselves at the 
expense of other groups. Also, agents in charge of assigning resources overtly steal the 
principal’s resource. As long as the power relations that protect the beneficiaries remain 
intact, interventions that leak economic wealth area sustainable (Webster & Lai, 2003).  
2.4.4.2 Sociological analysis of the local government 
 “Despite the clear importance of local government… there is no properly developed 
and generally accepted theory of the behavior and objectives of local government, or the 
‘local state’ ” (Knox & Pinch, 2000: 156). In numerous literature of the local state, the 
managerialist view concludes that the local state is controlled by officials whose goal 
and values are crucial in determining policy outcomes. It is also argued that this 
approach does not give adequate recognition either to the influence of local elites and 
pressure groups or to the economic and political constraints by the national state – in 
another word, for whom or for what the functions of the state operate, whether they are 
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class-biased, and the extent to which they reflect external political forces (Duncan and 
Goodwin, 1982). In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have turned to 
Marxian theories of political economy to relate urban spatial structure to the institutions 
of urban society. Attempt has more been focused on the structuralist and instrumentalist 
positions, both of which stem directly from Marxian theory and share certain views on 
the role of the local state (Knox & Pinch, 2000). The ‘structuralist’ view believes that 
the local state is an adjunct of the national state, with both acting in response to the 
prevailing balance of class forces within society. By using a case in London, Cockburn 
(1977) supports the Marxian structuralist view that the local state tends to safeguard the 
long-term interests of the dominant class as a relatively autonomous adjunct of the 
national state. The ‘instrumentalist’ view thinks that the local state is an instrument of 
the business élite, it largely derives from Miliband’s work. Miliband (1969) emphasizes 
the significance of the class backgrounds of top decision-makers, presenting evidence to 
show that the social composition of senior positions which include the local 
governments is to ensure that the interests of capital will receive a sympathetic hearing.  
 
2.4.4.2.1 Growth coalition and urban regime 
Two influential concepts –"growth coalition" model and "urban regime" analysis – have 
been popularized to understand and interpret the urban development and redevelopment 
in contemporary North American cities (Logan and Molotch, 1984; Logan and Molotch, 
1987; Molotch, 1993; Stone, 1989; Stone, 1993; Lauria, 1997; Elkin, 1987; Fainstein 




Faced with the rapid decentralization of jobs and residents, and distant control of the 
economies, local governments lost a great deal of power and had to ‘privatize’ many of 
the functions and responsibilities that then once hold in previous phases. Local 
governments turned increasingly to the private sector for capital for economic and 
social investment through public-private partnerships and gave much greater priority to 
economic development than to the traditional service-based functions of the local state 
(Knox & Pinch, 2000). This is so-called ‘growth coalition’. Defined as “partnerships of 
private- and public-sector interests that implement strategies to enhance the economic 
development of cities and regions, largely through attracting inward investment, mostly 
from the private sector but also from public funds”(Knox and Pinch, 2000: 408), growth 
coalition is also termed as civic boosterism or civic entrepreneurialism. Growth 
coalition has fostered a speculative and piecemeal approach to the management of cities, 
with a good deal of emphasis on master projects which are seen as having the greatest 
capacity to enhance property values and generate retail turnover and employment 
growth (Hall and Hubbard, 1996). 
Regime theory attempts to examine how growth coalitions of different interest come 
together to achieve spatial outcomes in cities (Lauria, 1996; Feagin, 1997; Jonas and 
Wilson, 1999). The theory of urban regimes is essentially about the management of 
interest groups and the establishment of policies that reinforce cooperation and share 
out the benefits of growth. The relationships between actors in a given regime exist 
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within a set of prevailing system of formal government control and the nature of the 
resources mobilized business (Stone, 1989). It is crucial in regime theory that power 
does not flow automatically but should be actively acquired. City officials seek alliances 
that enhance their ability to achieve visible policy results. All these alliance constitute 
regimes for local economic and urban development. Regimes are becoming more and 
more complex with the study of ‘locality’, ‘nimbyism’, ‘civic jingoism’, etc. (Cox & 
Mair, 1988, 1991; Smyth, 1994; Boyle, 1997; Barlow, 1995; Molotch & Logan, 1984). 
2.4.4.2.2 The developmental state in East Asian countries 
Frequent intervention from the developmental state has long been discovered in East 
Asian countries (Evans, 1995; Haggard, 1990; Onis, 1991; White, 1988, Chan, Clark & 
Lam, 1998). Being a plan-rational economy with market-rational political institutions, 
the developmental state plays an active and strategic role in guiding market forces to 
achieve the goal of economic and urban growth (Zhu et al., 2004). 
 
The developmental state paradigm was based on the study of Japan, Korean and some 
other East Asian countries and emerged as an innovative theoretical alternative by 
elucidating the casual nexus between political institutions and economic performance. It 
was woven around three interrelated observations. First, the East Asian states place top 
priority on economic development operationalized in terms of growth, productivity, and 
competitiveness. Second, in order to achieve these broadly defined goals and 
preferences, the state actively intervenes in the market to guide, discipline, and 
coordinate the private sector through the strategic allocation of resources and the use of 
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diverse policy instruments. Finally, strategic intervention by the state and its success are 
ensured by rational and competent bureaucrats who are insulated from political and 
social pressures. Close cooperation between the state and the private sector, and the 
prevailing consensus on corporate goals, both of which result from a homogeneous 
social fabric and the Confucian culture, have minimized the risk of opportunism by 
individual utility-maximizing actors (Evans, 1995; Haggard, 1990; Onis, 1991; White, 
1988).  
 
Within the state, its structure is composed of several distinguishable dimensions: 
executive leadership, executive-bureaucratic nexus, intra-bureaucratic dynamics, and 
bureaucratic constituents. The cohesion, unity, and dominance of state structure depend 
on the combination of these dimensions. The East Asian developmental states were 
regarded to have functional links to their society – They are ‘institutionally embedded’ 
in their societies. Vertical command and discipline are matched with horizontal 
consultation and consensus through shared corporate goals, producing harmonious 
relations between the state and the private sector and enhancing the exchange of 
knowledge essential for economic performance. A multitude of intermediate 
organizations link government agencies and the private sector, including advisory 
councils, apex business associations, industry associations, varied public enterprises 
such as research associations and public finance institutions, as well as informal 
associations such as alumni societies and social clubs (Chan, Clark and Lam, 1998). 
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There also were criticisms which focus on a reductionist assumption of the state, 
incomplete and even misleading elucidation of state society links, and growing doubts 
about positive correlation between the state and economic performance. Bureaucratic 
agencies are not organizational islands, but are beholden to corresponding social groups 
and obliged to protect their interests and solicit their support (Calder, 1988; Doner, 1991; 
Kernell, 1991; Moon, 1988; Samuel, 1987).  There is the “visible hand” omnipresent 
in urban redevelopment. Market forces work undeniably, but are tamed substantially by 
the state. 
2.4.4.3 Changing role of the government in the transitional economy  
“The rejection of private ownership of capital and of the means of production, including 
land, has been a central tenet of Marxist ideology” (Bertaud & Renaud, 1997:137). The 
land market in the centrally-planned economy is suppressed. Under the 
administrative-command economy, the absence of land prices eliminated the main 
incentive to recycle land by removing site value considerations from investment 
decisions. It has had a negative impact on the internal efficiency, productivity, 
environmental quality, and livability of the socialist city (Bertaud & Renaud, 1997). 
 
Since 1990, urban laws and constitutional reforms promoting individual ownership and 
decisions have been enacted in Russia, as well as in other socialist countries (Bertaud & 
Renaud, 1997). Economic reforms introduce the land market. The new land price 
gradient arouses the interest of different actors for urban redevelopment and raises the 
efficiency of the socialist city. The emergence of markets and the opening to the world 
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economy are leading to major absolute and relative shifts in urban development and 
redevelopment behaviors. 
 
2.4.4.3.1 Growth coalition and the local developmental state in transitional China 
Situations are a little different in China. In the transitional China, economic 
decentralization has resulted in the decreasing capacity of the state and the emergence 
of developmental interest (Lin, 1999; Logan, 2002). It is widely cognized that the new 
institutions have structured the activity of urban (re)development in China (Naughton, 
1995; Walder, 1995; Lin, 1997; Gaubatz, 1999; Zhu, 1999; Han, 2000). The imperative 
of economic growth has been highlighted by many China specialists as one of the 
decisive forces explaining the dynamics of Chinese urban development in the 
transitional economy (Chang, 1981; Lo, 1987; Cannon, 1990; Chan, 1992 and Pannell, 
1990) and “urban regime”, “growth coalition” and “developmental state” have been 
widely deployed to explain the driving force of urban development and redevelopment 
in China (Zhu, 1999; Oi, 1996).  
 
In the transitional phase, the forces of decentralization, marketization and political 
legitimization have transferred Chinese local governments into local states with a strong 
interest in development. They act in response to local prosperity but not as passive 
agents of the central government. China’s local governments are highly motivated to 
maximize revenues to support local growth and this makes them economic interest 
groups with their own policy agenda (Zhu, 2004). When the local developmental state is 
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under pressure to pursue development and urban growth, non-state owned developers – 
which hold the capital and thus lead the urban growth – often gain the upper-hand over 
the government in the negotiations for development. 
2.5 Summary 
Urban development is always regarded as a comprehensive process, in terms of 
strategies, interests and actions of the various actors involved in the development 
process, development stages, and different forces in shaping urban development. 
Theories to explain the complex process are constantly developed and tested. The 
neo-classical models and Marxist models, even when leaving aside their respective 
assumptions of human behavior and economic action, can be criticized on the way they 
deal with the institutional context. The new institutional economics analysis and the 
property rights approach are revealed in this review to be able to provide a tool to 
analyze the behaviors and interactions of actors in urban development and 
redevelopment process. Existing research also highlighted the role of the government. 
Some sociological views such as ‘growth coalition’ and ‘the local developmental state’ 
have already been applied to the studies of the transitional economies, for instance, 
transitional China.  
 
Nevertheless, the unique patterns of land redevelopment under China’s transitional 
economy distinguish China’s practice from other western countries. Basing on the 
literature of property rights and institutions, this study will develop an alternative 





3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Case Study Approach 
3.1.1 Case study as a research strategy 
Research strategies are the ways of investigating an empirical topic by following a set 
of pre-specified procedures. There are several research strategies, which include 
experiment, survey, archival analysis, history and case study. Each strategy is a different 
way of collecting and analyzing empirical evidence (Yin, 2003).  
 
Basically, select of research strategies is decided by the research questions. The essence 
of a case study has been defined by Schramm (1971: emphasis added) as that “it tries to 
illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were 
implemented, and with what result.”  In general, case studies are the preferred strategy 
when “how” and “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little 
control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some 
real-life context. The case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety 
of evidence – documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations. The case study as a 
research strategy comprises an all-encompassing method – covering the logic of design, 
data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis.  
 
“The empirical sciences derive knowledge from direct experience based on the senses. 
Facts are accurately observed and reported” (Guy and Henneberry, 2002: 5). Through a 
review and description of an event with a clear clue of development and insight analysis, 
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case studies collect information of a typical example which represents the 
characteristics of many other similar cases. Especially for the study in the sociological 
field, case study observes in all respects and facets, and reveals both the internal 
connection and external influence. Merits of the case study approach make it widely 
adopted in research. Compared with the economic models of equilibrium, case study 
reveals insights which exist in the “blackbox” (Coase, 1992).   
 
A common prejudice about case studies is that they provide little basis for scientific 
generalization. Actually, cases studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions and 
not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study does not represent a 
“sample”, and in doing a case study, the goal would be to expand and generalize 
theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalization) (Yin, 2003).  
 
3.1.2 Land market in China as a special case 
The land market is a local market. The spatial outcome of the land market is 
significantly influenced by the actions of key decision-makers and mediators such as 
landowners, developers, estate agents and housing managers, whose motivation and 
behavior effectively structure the supply of built environment. All these conditions 
differ from one area to another. Given the differences in socioeconomic and cultural 
contexts within which a land market operates, the institutional structure of a market is 
place- and time- specific (Ball, 1998). There is no general model for the provision of 
 50
urban built environment. That is the reason that case study approach is adopted for this 
research.  
 
China is a huge country and comprehensive statistics of land development are not 
available. There are great disparities among the regions of China, owing to the different 
regional socioeconomic factors such as physical environment, politics and local 
economies. It is thus impossible to have a description on China’s urban transformation 
both comprehensive with depth and representative across the country. But, under the 
same overall institutional environment, a case study can make contribution to a general 
profile of land redevelopment in China’s metropolises. 
 
Moreover, China’s reform towards a market system is a gradual process, and there 
appears a series of intermediate forms of institutions. The reform process is in a 
non-standard unstable format. But, such process may advance to patterns. As 
comprehensive statistics of land development are not available, quantitative methods 
could hardly be adopted for this research. Instead, case studies could record relevant 
events and thus find out the patterns of institutional changes. 
 
3.2 Choice of Study Area 
Guangzhou 
This research chooses the case of Jinhuajie jiedao3, a typical built-up area located in 
Guangzhou central city which has gone through urban renewal since the 1980s. 
                                                        
3 Jiedao (street community) is the township level division in urban area of the People's Republic of China. It is an 
administrative cell for the state to organize the social life within a city. An urban district is administratively divided to 
several Jiedaos to deliver governance and social welfare. 
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Guangzhou is the ‘southern gateway’ of China. As an ancient civilized city, Guangzhou 
has a history of over 2000 years. Lying at the tip of Pearl River Delta (PRD) and the 
confluence of Dong River and North River, Guangzhou possesses exceptional 
advantage in geographic location. In Guangzhou, the place remaking for an 
international metropolitan city is trying to create a new vision of old downtowns by 
large scaled redevelopment projects (Xu & Yeh, 2003). Guangzhou’s importance in the 
national development and its typicality in the China’s redevelopment of urban built 
environment since the economic reform make it chosen for this research. 
 
Figure 3.1 Location of Guangzhou and its Main Administrative Districts 
(Xu & Yeh, 2003: 362) 
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Guangzhou’s location in south China has uniquely important political-economic and 
social-cultural implications. Being one of the cities that first been designated open to 
“market”, Guangzhou’s development has been “one step ahead of China” for a long 
period (Vogel, 1989; Xu & Yeh, 2003). The city has benefited from preferential policies, 
e.g., the most relaxed financial policy and the first locations set aside for foreign trade 
(Fan, 1995). The economy of Guangzhou has grown very rapidly since the reforms. 
When marketization of urban land has been carried out to replace previous free 
allocation of land assets, the gradual and incremental nature of the urban reform has cast 
intriguing impact on the forms of urban development and redevelopment. 
 
Facing the rapid changing environment, Guangzhou adapts its strategies for urban 
development and redevelopment. Land redevelopment has been carried out in 
Guangzhou in the 1980s and accelerating since 1990. During the period from 1992 to 
1999, 4481.7 hectares of land in central areas (Dongshan, Yuexiu, Liwan and Haizhu 
Districts) of Guangzhou has been provided to the land market for redevelopment (Li, 
2002). Housing development in urban areas offers a clue for the rapid land 
redevelopment (see Table 3.1). Urban spatial structure in central areas has been under 
major transformation. 
Table 3.1 Housing Development in Urban Districts4 of Guangzhou 
Period 50-52 52-57 58-62 63-65 65-70 70-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 95-2000 
7.07 61.4 61.15 49.1 59.38 Investment(￥million) 97.18 478.84 2973.25 7583.74 39316.49 97912.54
Floorarea Completed 
(thousand m²) 
99 997 1053 609 1164 1192 3993 14517 17671 25567 43669 
              (GSB, 2003: 108) 
                                                        
4 Urban districts of Guangzhou refer to Yuexiu, Dongshan, Haizhu, Liwan, Tianhe, Baiyun, Whampoa, Fangchun. 
 53
Jinhuajie 
Nowadays, with a population of 9.94 million in 2000, Guangzhou Municipality covers 
an area of 7434 km². It is made up of by two county-level cities and ten city districts. To 
get insight of the function of land redevelopment in Guangzhou, a small area is needed 
to elaborate the details. A Street Community (jiedao) named Jinhuajie (see Figure 3.2) 
with an area about 44 ha in Guangzhou central city is chosen for an intensive 
investigation. 
 
Jinhuajie jiedao is a Street Community (jiedao) in Liwan District, which has long been 
the urban commercial and service centre of Guangzhou city. The territory of Liwan 
District was once named as “Xiguan”, where quays of Guangzhou port were located. 
Trade and business were flourishing in this area. This tradition was suppressed during 
the period from 1949 to 1979 by the development of factories when industry 
development was emphasized in every city in China. Several factories have been 
provided in the western part of Jinhuajie during this period. Since the economic reform, 
Liwan District gained back its superiority in business and service with the fast 
developing tertiary sector. Comprehensive large-scale redevelopment projects in 
Jinhuajie carried out since the late 1980s are the pilot urban redevelopment projects in 
Guangzhou. Residents, state subordinated REDCs, foreign developers and private 
developers have all been involved in those projects. Twenty years’ urban renewal offers 
an opportunity to study the evolution of the way how land redevelopment is carried out. 
Later in the 1990s, factories in Jinhuajie began to move out the central area and this 
process made Jinhuajie a typical area of the redevelopment of SOEs land. Due to the 
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above reasons, the examination of Jinhuejie jiedao’s urban redevelopment can thus shed 
light on the urban redevelopment issues and problems in the city of Guangzhou and 
other Chinese cities. This research covers the period from 1980 to current, during which 



























Figure 3.2 Location of the Study Area – Jinhuajie 
Source: files in GUPB, accessed on July 8, 2004 
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3.3 Data Collection 
In Guangzhou, as this case study characterizes the pattern of property rights in the land 
market, roles of different actors and interdependent relationships between each other are 
to be discovered. Various forms of both quantitative and qualitative materials are used. 
Four sources of evidence are used in data collection for case studies: documentation, 
archival records, interviews and direct observation. In Guangzhou, archives and 
interviews are more important as second-hand materials are limited or not so reliable. 
 
3.3.1 Yearbooks 
Three kinds of yearbooks are used as the data sources of urban development of 
Guangzhou in different stages. Guangzhou Yearbook has been published ever since 
1983 and offers an overall idea of the economic and social development in Guangzhou 
since the reform began. Based on this, Guangzhou Statistics Yearbook fills in data to 
support the description in Guangzhou Yearbooks. Furthermore, Guangzhou 
Construction Yearbook, which was firstly published in 1996, specially focus on the 
urban planning control and real estate development. Construction Yearbooks offer an 
insight of the institutions for urban development in Guangzhou.  
3.3.2 Government authorities records 
 
In China, Urban Planning Bureau (UPB), Land Resource and Housing Bureau (LRHB), 
and Construction Bureau (CB) control the urban development throughout the urban and 
rural area officially. Records in these departments are thus of great importance in 




The records of Planning Permission and Land Use Approval have been found in the 
Division of Land Use Control in both UPB and LRHB of Guangzhou municipality.  
Record of Issue of Planning Permission (UPB, archive) 
Record of Land Acquisition (UPB, archive) 
Record of Issue of Land Use Approval (LRHB, archive) 
Record of Urban Redevelopment Project of Jinhuajie (CB of Liwan District, archive) 
 
3.3.3 Maps and charts 
Relief maps at 1982 and present are available in Guangzhou Urban Planning & Design 
Survey Research Institute, and aerial maps and charts for current situation are offered by 
LRHB. On the relief and aerial maps, change of urban built environment can easily 
been detected. Unfortunately, self-funded conservation of old houses, which might 
includes some conversion of land uses is very difficult to detect as they are listed neither 
in records of UPB or LRHB nor the relief or aerial maps. However, all the change, 
which is big enough to show difference in maps is studied carefully, the discrepancy is 
thus very small. Furthermore, the interpretation of maps is assisted with the record for 
land use permissions and approvals.     
 
3.3.4 Laws, policies and urban plans 
Although laws, policies and urban plans are not always completely executed, they set 
the framework and limitation for urban development and redevelopment. Data of the 
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standard of compensation for resettlement during urban redevelopment and parameters 
of planning control over development have been collected and listed as follows. Such 
standard and plans set the boundary for actors’ behavior. 
“Measures of Land Acquisition and Urban Demolition and Resettlement in 
Guangzhou” (1984) 
“Guidelines to Implementation of Urban Demolition and Resettlement in 
Guangzhou” (1992) 
“Temporary Regulations for the Allocation of Guangzhou Land Revenue” (1992) 
“Notice on reduce of land leasing payment of state-owned enterprises” (1995) 
“Notice on enhancing the management of land conveyance prices in Guangzhou” 
(1997) 
“Regulations of Urban Demolition and Resettlement in Guangzhou” (1997) 
“Temporary regulations on management of administratively allocated land during 
SOE reforms” (1998) 
“Management Measures of Urban Housing Demolishment in Guangzhou” (2004).
Plans, which set the target for urban development of each period, offer much useful 
information including land acquisition data, urban built environment situation in each 
period. Only plans related to the study area have been carefully studied: 
Plan for Renewal and Conservation of the Areas along Kangwang Rd. （Guangzhou 
Urban Plan & Design Service of Automation Centre & College of Civil Engineering & 
Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, 2003)  
Urban Design for the Areas along Zhongshan Rd. (Guangzhou Planning Automatic 
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Centre, 2001) 
Plan for Conservation of Ximenkou Area (Guangzhou Planning Automatic Centre, 2001) 
Innovation Plan for Guangzhou Central Areas – Liwan (L01) District Plan 
(Guangzhou Urban Plan & Design Service of Automation Centre, 1998) 
Guidance for Planning Control over Liwan District (Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau 
& Guangzhou Urban Plan Research Centre, 2003） 
Urban Plan for Guangzhou City (UPB, 1984) 
Urban Planning for Jinhuajie (Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau, 1983) in GUPB eds. 
Collection of Planning for Blocks in Guangzhou 
 
3.3.5 Interviews and observations 
Besides the fact that records and data in government authorities are fragmental and 
sometimes not continuous, many ‘illegal’ developments are not shown in these authority 
records. Observation and interviews are thus used to fill up the gap between the fact and 
records (see Appendix I). On-spot study has been taken for several times and the current 
situation of urban built environment was discovered. To find out the institutions behind 
the urban development, interviews are taken with planners, officials, scholars, residents, 
staff in People’s Congress, etc. Simple enquiries for information of urban environment 
changes are also done constantly throughout the process of visiting to the study area. 
Much useful information is gained from consulted unknown residents, workers, officials 
to whom the author would like to show her acknowledgement. 
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3.4 Theoretical Framework 
“A series of distinctive new urban landscapes is emerging from a socio-spatial dialectic 
dominated by the effects of the reconfiguration of economic and cultural life” (Knox, 
1991: 203). Change of landscapes in Chinese cities is structured by a series of 
institutional changes. Land redevelopment is characterized by the conflicts and balance 
between actors under formal and informal institutions. Based on the literature review, 
and objectives of this research, an analytical framework is developed here to discover 
the institutional changes and their impact on land redevelopment in transitional China 
via a property rights approach. 
 
3.4.1 Basic Framework 
Shown in Figure 3.3, the three development eras, which include the centrally planned 
economy era, the transitional economy era and the market economy era, represent the 
time dimension of China’s land redevelopment. These three eras signify China’s unique 
pattern of economic transition from the centrally-planned system to a socialist market. 
In particular, the intermediate era in the transition, which is what China is currently 
experiencing, is the key step in which institutional changes occur and are imposed on 
the land development process in Chinese cities. 
 
A three-level hierarchy is introduced to mark out the main components in the land 
redevelopment in transitional China: the institutions, the actors in land redevelopment 
process and the spatial outcomes– built environment. The three components stand for 
the rules of the game, the game players and the results. The land redevelopment process 
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acts as the link between the institutions and the urban built environment and is the key 
to decode the mechanisms of land redevelopment under the context of institutional 
change in China’s transitional economy. Institutions are the rules of the game and they 
are humanly created to constraint human’s interaction. Functions of institutions are 
realized through the structuring of actors’ property rights over land in the land market 
for land redevelopment (Webster & Lai, 2003). On the one hand, powers and interests 
of actors show the property rights over land, and institutional changes evolve along the 
process of interactions among the actors. On the other hand, property rights over land 
would impose constraints on the behaviors of actors in land redevelopment process and 
thus decide the outcomes of land redevelopment.  
 
According to the theory of institutional changes, institutions in one era are influenced 
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(North, 1990). Path dependence mechanisms are the tool to explore the institutional 
changes in the transitional land markets. The economic reform is started from the 
economic system with institutions which distort building provision with poor incentives. 
Gradually it moves into a relatively efficient socialist market system. The special 
institutional changes structure property rights over land to experience a series of events 
and junctures during the transition. The property rights over land in the transitional 
economy are thus somehow determined by the property rights in the centrally-planned 
system, and the existing property rights may counteract the new institutions in the 
transitional era.  
 
3.4.2 “Redevelopment process” module 
 
Figure 3.4 Main Actors and Land Redevelopment Process 
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redevelopment in transitional China by tracking the evolution of actor’s property rights. 
Zooming into the emerging land market of the transitional economy era, the structure of 
property rights over land and the evolution of property rights is studied by looking into 
the roles of different actors in the land redevelopment process (see Figure 3.4). 
 
A variety of actors with different roles and interests in the land and property 
development process have come into play. Three actors have been highlighted in the 
redevelopment process — the local state, the land users and developers. Based on the 
study of actor models of development process, developers are placed as the centre of the 
redevelopment function diagram since they arrange and carry out the redevelopment 
projects (Maclaran, 1993). Developers’ relationships with other actors have been 
generalized to four sub-processes which include the processes of land transfer, planning 
control, project finance and development.  
 
The local government plays a dominant role in land redevelopment process. Economic 
decentralization in China since 1978 has resulted in decentralization of the power of 
economic decision-making. With the reforms, commoditization and marketization of 
urban land have been introduced to replace the free allocation of land in all Chinese 
cities. After 30 years’ practice of free allocation as a socialist production means, urban 
land has been restored as an economic asset which could deliver large amount of 
revenue to the local government. Promoted by the emerging developmental interests, 
the local state plays the most important role in land redevelopment process by 
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intervening into various sub-processes of land redevelopment. The local governments of 
Chinese cities advocate land redevelopment to pursue the land revenue in the locality 
and pursue political achievement (Oi, 1996; Zhu, 1999). The local government not only 
formulates development directions and set up rules and regulations, but also actively 
participates in development projects by defining the property rights of the actors. Land 
redevelopment in transitional China is thus more dependent on state involvement and 
even dominated by the government. 
 
In addition, in the land redevelopment process, land users are not passive and they 
pursue their own interests based on their property rights. Nominally owned by the state, 
land in Chinese cities is actually used and controlled by land users. Land users include 
the residents and danweis5 which include state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and statutory 
organizations. During the central-planning era, land was administratively allocated to 
the land users without any land rent or time limit. As what has been emphasized by 
Marcuse, “in socialist systems, the right of use …even if referred to as ‘tenancy’, 
equaled or exceeded in many ways those conventionally associated with ‘ownership’” 
(1996: 135). Due to gradualism prevailing during the transition, the existing land users 
have a vested interest for bargaining in land redevelopment process. The land 
redevelopment is thus carried out and evolves with the interaction of various actors, 
structuring by the actor’s evolving property rights. 
 
                                                        
5 “Danwei refers to a variety of state-owned enterprises, non-profit institutes and governmental bureaus where most 
urban residents were employed during China’s centralized system. A danwei was a work unit that has such attributes 
as personnel administration, communal facilities, urban or non-agricultural purview and public sector. It was an 
instrument with which the government exerts political and social controls over citizens and it was also a provider 
through which the state distributes socialist ‘welfare’ to workers” (Zhu, 2004: 1249). 
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3.5 Summary 
This chapter presents the research approach, study area, study period, data collection 
and research framework. Under the context of China’s transitional economy, case study 
approach is adopted to provide an in-depth analysis of institutional change. While based 
on China’s overall context, this study chooses the redevelopment of a typical central 
area of Guangzhou, i.e. Jinhuajie – as the case. The case study approach is not aiming at 
to find out a place which could represent the overall situation of redevelopment in 
Chinese cities, but to offer a base for in-sight investigation. Four sources of evidence are 
used in data collection for this case study: yearbooks, government authorities records, 
maps and charts, policies and urban plans, and interviews and observations. 
 
The analytical framework developed above provides the base to discover the institutional 
changes and their impact on land redevelopment in transitional China via a property 
rights approach. A three-level hierarchy is introduced to mark out the main components 
in the land redevelopment in transitional China: the institutions, the actors in land 
redevelopment process and the spatial outcomes– built environment. Three actors have 
been highlighted in the redevelopment process — the local state, the land users and 
developers. Developers’ relationships with other actors have been generalized to four 
sub-processes which include the processes of land transfer, planning control, project 
finance and development. This study is to discover the institutional changes by studying 
the interaction among actors during the four processes. 
 
Based on above theoretical framework, a detail case study is provided to scrutinize the 
 65
land redevelopment process, so as to track the changing land redevelopment behaviors 
and evolving property rights over land.  
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4 BACKGROUND OF REDEVELOPMENT: NEW LOCAL 
DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS IN GUANGZHOU 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the background and impetus of the land redevelopment in 
Guangzhou. Since 1978, a series of reforms have been initiated by the government 
towards the socialist market mechanisms. With the reforms, local development interests 
are aroused and the local government advocates redevelopment to chase the land 
revenue and political performance. However, changes in the power of decision-making 
and land revenue collection were carried out within the old system which formerly 
played a pivotal role in the central planning system. The old institutions have a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo and are in a strong bargaining position to influence 
institutional changes (Zhu, 2005). Land users, who have been endowed with strong land 
use rights, are keen to maximize their profit during the redevelopment process. Due to 
the disparity between the interests of the local developmental state and the existing land 
users, gradual institutional changes for land redevelopment in transitional China have 
been generated. 
 
Reforms which generate the local interest of land redevelopment are examined in terms 
of historical order: 1949-1978, 1979-1987 and after 1988 in this Chapter. In each section, 
emphases of analyses are placed on the political and economic environment. 
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4.2 Old Institutions (1949 – 1978) 
4.2.1 Centrally-planned administration system 
 
Following the example of USSR, a completely centrally-planned system for resource 
allocation was set up in 1949 and last for 30 years till 1978. China’s local administrative 
system was multi-layered and complex and might appear to an outsider as inherently 
contradictory. It was an administrative system which pervades urban and rural society, a 
system born of imperial roots, shaped by Stalinist goals of social control. It was highly 
centralized and extended throughout every aspect of Chinese social life. In its formal 
structure, urban administration in China comprised of a nested hierarchy, in essence 
forming a governmental pyramid. At the pinnacle was the central government; below 
was a stratum of provincial and municipal governments. Then the administration system 
was divided into districts; in cities there were in turn subdivided into street communities 
(Jiedao6) and community committees (Juweihui). Through this nested hierarchy, the 
Chinese governmental structure extended continuously from the central government 
down to the level of the household. 
 
This hierarchy of units constitutes not all the administration system. In the practical 
exercise of urban governance, it works in combination with other organizational 
structures. The most important one was the line agencies from central government 
ministries, which form a ‘vertical axis’ of administration to complement the ‘horizontal 
axis’ of the territorial structure. Daiwei under the supervision of central government 
                                                        
6 Jiedao is an administrative cell for the state to organize the social life within a city. Generally, one district is 
composed by several jiedao and one jiedao is composed by several juwei, which is the smallest administrative units 
for the state to control and manage the urban citizens. 
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ministries undertook both production and reproduction activities (Wu, 1998). “Danwei 
refers to a variety of state-owned enterprises, non-profit institutes and governmental 
bureaus where most urban residents were employed during China’s centralized system. 
A danwei was a work unit that has such attributes as personnel administration, 
communal facilities, urban or non-agricultural purview and public sector. It was an 
instrument with which the government exerts political and social controls over citizens 
and it was also a provider through which the state distributes socialist ‘welfare’ to 
workers” (Zhu, 2004: 1249).  What thus emerged was an institutional structure which 
allowed for firm hierarchical links when necessary, yet wide latitude of personal 
discretion at lower levels of practice. 
 
Being located at a peripheral level, the local government was not encouraged to 
organize collective consumption at a municipal level. In fact, the homogeneous 
distribution of economical production (reproduction) and non-separated social classes 
were intervolving (Wu, 1995). The vertical linkage between supervisory departments 
and subordinate enterprises made it impossible for the municipality to finance for 
unified urban development. Furthermore, the municipality was required to provide 
urban infrastructure and public facilities for the state projects. This resulted in 
bargaining for investment between the central and local state when a state project was to 
be allocated. 
 
4.2.2 Land allocation and use 
 
Under the socialist centrally controlled system, property rights over resources were 
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nationalized. Throughout China, “the state determined the allocation and utilization of 
resources through directives, rather than by pricing mechanisms” (Zhu, 2002: 43). The 
fact that urban development took place in a period when land was nationalized and 
administratively allocated rather than sold in an open market for a price had a very 
profound impact on the internal organization of Chinese cities. 
 
One of the outcomes was the pattern of land use and resource allocation to the 
development of built environment. Administrative decisions based on “needs” and 
norms had so far governed the use and quantity of land consumed. Land was 
administratively transferred to the land user by the state. No land rent and time limit 
were required but the land user was not allowed to transact or transfer his land use right. 
In the meantime, almost all revenues were remitted to the central treasury department 
and then transferred back to local governments and industrial firms according to 
expenditures planned by the government (Zhu, 2002). It was the vertical hierarchy that 
the supervisory departments allocated investment and funds to the SOEs. By allocating 
capital construction investment (CCI), the government set up a project-specific method 
of development organisation and a planning system based on economic sectors (see 
Figure 4.1).  
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 Source: Wu, 1998 
Figure 4.1 Building Provision in Pre-reform Era  
 
The absence of land prices removed all incentives to redevelopment of the built-up 
areas, which resulted in a land use freeze. Once land was allocated, it was almost never 
recycled. Without price signals, it was administratively simpler to respond to current 
land demand pressure by developing at the periphery than to redevelop well-located 
areas with obsolete land uses. While the city expanded outward, land use in already 
developed areas remained unchanged. Urban development was thus getting into a 
wicked cycle of acquisition of agricultural land and wasteful industrial development. 
Development of urban land followed the steps of: expansion of industrial land – 
residential use filling in – commercial and service facilities equipping (Wu, 1990). This 
pattern of land use brought fragmental urban land and sizable enclaves of “fallow” or 
“dead land”.  
 
4.2.3 Industrial development 
Structure of building provision                the element of urban landscape 
 
At the beginning of the People’s Republic of China, the dominance of industrial 
planning was emphasized by the government and the chief target of social production 
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was to transform China from an agricultural country to industrial one, and from new 
democratic country to socialistic one (Central Finance and Economics Office of China, 
1999). Industries were located as they pleased in the centre of the city. Performance of 
housing was measured by its ability to reduce input costs while meeting quantitative 
production targets. SOEs thus exist to closely connect workers’ personal life with 
industrial production within each work unit. Some work units are produced as 
self-reliant communities with mixed residential and industrial use. Inevitably, SOEs 
who occupied the urban land were likely to maximize their own utility within the 
limitation of existing institutional matrix, which may not accord with the interests of the 
state (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
At the end of 1950s, Guangzhou was made the “central industrial base of South China” 
(Xu & Yeh, 2003: 363). All resources were allocated to support industrial development. 
After 30 years of industrial development, the commercial sector of Guangzhou withered 
in the closed centrally-planned economy. The tertiary sector accounted for a 
proportionately less and less share in GDP from 49% in 1952 to 30% in 1978 
(Guangzhou Statistical Bureau, 1998: 23). 
 
4.3 Generating Local Development Interests (1978-1987) 
4.3.1 Economic reforms: decentralization of economic decision-making and 
emergence of local interests 
In the 1970s, severe fiscal deficit was experienced by the local government in carrying 
out urban development. “The legitimacy of the party leadership was in jeopardy.  
Economic growth seemed the only goal able to appeal to a people who had suffered 
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class struggle and proletariat dictatorship for many years” (Zhu, 2004b: 428). Economic 
reforms were thus initiated to restructure the administrative and financial relationships 
between central and local governments. 
 
With the initiation of economic reforms, economic decision-making was decentralized. 
Administrative power was granted to local governments such as power of examination 
and approval of fixed asset investment projects; power of foreign trade and exchange 
administration; power of price control; power of distribution; power of visa notification; 
power of payroll adjustment, etc. Administrative decentralization has significantly 
decreased the direct control of the central government on local development (Leaf, 
1995). It gave decision-making power to agents (local governments and SOEs) who 
began to pursue their own interests (Pryor, 1973; Reeve, 1986; Zhu, 2002). Particularly, 
the central government also granted preferential policies offering more power of 
economic management to open coastal cities such as Guangzhou. However, 
administrative decentralization generated not only greater autonomy but also greater 
responsibility to the local governments as slow growth would represent a less capable 
government (Han, 2000). The local governments were thus pushed to pursue high 
growth rate for better “political and economical performance”. 
 
Administrative decentralization was associated with the provision of fiscal incentives. 
Incentives of development, used to be political, were gradually becoming economic 
(Zhu, 2002). Starting in 1980, the “fiscal contracting system” replaced the previous 
 73
system of central collection and allocation of development revenues. Local governments 
entered into long-term (usually 5 year) fiscal contracts with higher level governments, 
and were allowed to retain most revenues. In addition, local governments also received 
“extra-budgetary funds”7 (yushuanwai shouru), which were not subject to sharing with 
the central state. The scope of local “extra-budgetary funds”, which were mainly used to 
construct projects initiated by local state, had expanded the economic basis of local 
governments (Blecher, 1991). As the local governments gained autonomy in revenue 
mobilization, they were keen to initiate more development projects to generate 
“extra-budgetary funds” and retain most the revenues at local levels to the detriment of 
central finance. The force of decentralization of the administrative and economic 
decision-making had transferred China’s local governments into local states with a 
strong interest in development and active actors responsible for local prosperity (Zhu, 
2004b).
 
4.3.2 Economic Restructuring  
The “open door” policy brought Guangzhou a new opportunity to gain back its role as 
the commercial centre and southern gateway of China. In 1984, Guangzhou was 
designated as one of the 14 coastal open cities. Aiming at “developing the city into the 
economic centre in southern China that was distinguished by its prosperity, civilization, 
stability and good environment” (The Editorial Board of Guangzhou History, 1995: 45), 
economic development of Guangzhou stepped into a new era. The economic reforms 
had liberalized the constraint on the development of tertiary sectors (Wu & Yeh, 1997; 
                                                        
7 Extra-budgetary funds consist of tax surcharges and user fees levied by the local government’s agencies as well as 
earnings from SOEs (Qian, 1999). 
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Xu & Yeh, 2003). Quickly, the contribution of tertiary sector to GDP rose to 37.4% in 
1985 (see Table 4.1). Light industries in Guangzhou also witnessed a rapid growth 
because of the opening up to foreign investment.  
 
Table 4.1 GDP and Tertiary Sector Growth of Guangzhou (million Yuan) 
Year 1975 1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 
GDP 3663.51 4309.47 5754.97 12436.23 31959.52 124306.97 237591.29 300147.60
Tertiary sector 946.82 1281.81 1993.25 4650.44 15756.89 58941.46 124949.47 167126.93
25.8 29.7 34.6 37.4 49.3 47.4 52.6 55.7 % of GDP* 
*: value-added by the tertiary sector as % of GDP                             Source: GSB, 2003 
 
With the development of tertiary sectors and prosperity of the economy, the investment 
sources were diversified (Wu, 1998). Urban development was now largely supported by 
local ‘self-raised fund’ (SRF8) which runs out of the state CCI system. The fund raiser – 
usually local governments and enterprises – could decide the allocation of SRF beyond 
the central plan. The emergence of SRF broke the traditional budgetary control over 
development and investment. In 1978, the state budget accounted for 62.2 percent of the 
total investment in fixed assets. In 1992, SRF accounted for 51.2 per cent of the total 
investment in fixed assets, whereas only 4.3 percent came from state investment 
throughout the whole country (State Statistics Bureau, 1992). The changes in investment 
structure in Guangzhou represent a typical case. State investment has been losing its 
dominant status ever since 1978. SRF became the main investment source in the 
structure of investment ever since the middle 1980s. In the meantime, although foreign 
investment was allowed to enter China since the economic reforms started in 1978, it 
was excluded from property development in Guangzhou until 1991. With SRF, 
                                                        
8 Self-raised funds refer to “funds received by construction enterprises from their responsible institutes, local 
governments, and within enterprises of the purpose of investment in fixed assets” (State Statistical Bureau, 1996: 
197). Use of self-raise funds is not included in the central economic plan. 
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government intended to nurture the urban development under local 
government-enterprise coalitions (Zhu, 1999). 
 
Economic growth of Guangzhou has further accelerated since the 1992 symbolic tour to 
southern China by Deng Xiaoping. One can have a clue of the economic development 
through the GDP growth (see Table 4.1). In 2000, the GDP of Guangzhou reached US$ 
30.3 billion. The tertiary sector became the main driving force of the city’s economy 
(Xu & Yeh, 2003). Economic growth and restructuring, together with improvement of 
living standards, have created great pressure on the demand for urban development. 
 
4.3.3 Housing commoditization and REDCs 
 
During the 1980s, the problems of public-sector-dominated housing system such as 
housing shortage, insufficient investment, unfair distribution, the low rent system and 
poor management became a major topic of discussion (Wang & Murie, 1996). The 
government began to search for new ways of housing provision. “Housing 
commoditization” (Zhufang shangpinhua) had been gradually introduced to China since 
1982 to reduce the heavy burden of building provision by the state and establishing an 
equitable and efficient housing system (Lin, 1986). Regarding to the housing 
commoditization scheme practiced in several cities for testing, initially, individuals paid 
one-third of the construction costs for a residential unit, with the government and the 
buyer’s work-unit each paying an equal share of the outstanding balance (Wu & Yeh, 
1997). The money paid by the individual was collected by the state and then invested in 
new housing projects. Further more, the allocation of actual housing units by SOEs was 
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gradually to be displaced by housing allowance to the salary (huobifenfang).  
 
Housing provision was also trying to change to the market supply and professional 
developers were invited into the domain of urban development. In 1984, State Council 
issued “Temporary Regulations Involving Systemic Reform of the Administration of 
the Construction Industry” which directed that “urban real estate development 
companies (REDCs) should be formed to carry out the comprehensive development of 
urban land and housing” and these REDCs would act as business enterprises largely 
responsible for their profits and losses (World Bank, 1993). Since then, many real estate 
development companies were established in Guangzhou under the supervision of 
different levels of government or industrial groups. Housing provision was no longer 
the obligation of government and danweis. Housing commodification stimulated both 
the housing demand and supply and provided the base for urban land reforms. 
 
4.4 Generating Local Development Interests (1988 – Present) 
4.4.1 Urban reform: paid land transfer  
In the later 1980s, the urban reform was initiated as a general umbrella under which 
comprehensive, nevertheless gradual, changes were initiated to install market-based, 
competitive mechanisms for resource allocation to the process of urbanisation, in 
parallel with the replacement of comprehensive and direct state involvement by 
interventions via indirect levers such as taxes, subsidies and macroeconomic policy 
tools (Zhu, 2002). Initiation of urban reforms was as a turning point of China’s urban 
development and redevelopment. 
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 At the core of urban reforms was separation of land use rights from the land ownership 
(Hu, 1995). In 1988, the Seventh People’s Congress amended Clause 4 of Article 10 of 
the constitution and for the first time made the paid transfer of land use rights official. 
Paid transfer of land use rights is equivalent to land leasing as exclusive rights to use land, 
to derive income from land and to transfer land are granted to the land user within a 
period (Cheung, 1982; Lai, 1995). Public land leasing by auction, tender and 
negotiation has been legalized so that urban land can be leased to developers or users 
for a fixed period after a payment of rent in a lump sum to the state (Xu, 2001; Zhu, 
2004a). Land has become a commodity. The rediscovery of the value of urban land has 
led to spatial restructuring in the central areas in the pursuit of maximum land use 
efficiency (Yeh & Wu, 1996).  
 
4.4.2 Emergence of the local developmental state  
 
Urban reform also stipulated that the state – which in reality was the local municipality 
for each city – monopolized the land leasing (Wu, 1998). The municipality acted as the 
legal authority of the urban development through the operation of land markets. Unified 
land acquisition by the municipal government was initiated. There is a trend for the 
government towards the redevelopment interests because: 
1. There is the pursuit of local economic growth measured by increases in GDP as 
political achievement and urban development contribute a lot in GDP growth (Oi, 1996; 
Zhu, 1999); 
2. There is a commitment to enhancing non-economic social provisions as the 
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governments have to seek the collaboration of the residents by meeting their 
requirement of living environment;  
3. Going beyond the concepts of economic growth and physical provisions, there are 
various concern of environmental protection and land conservation to create a 
world-class city with international standard to stand the regional and national 
competitions (Li, 1995; Dai, 1996; Xu, 2001). 
4. The new entrepreneurial class emerging since the economic reform is playing an 
extremely significant role in the economic and requiring urban restructuring for further 
economic growth. 
To facilitate the realization of such a comprehensive goal, the government advocates 
urban redevelopment and turns to a “socialist developmental state” (Oi, 1996; Zhu, 
2004b).  
 
As the land leasing became a critical revenue source for the capital-hungry local 
government, the local government was keen on leasing out as much land as possible to 
generate revenues for infrastructure construction. The area with issued Planning 
Permission far exceeded the actual land developed. Oversupply of land by the local 
government aggravated the oversupply of real estate. From July 1992 to June 1998, 
Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau issued 2208 Planning Permissions (covering a total 
area of 60.2 km²) for real estate development projects. However, there were only 765 
Land Use Notes9 issued by Land Resource and Housing Bureau, covering a total area of 
                                                        
9 Issue of Land Use Note means the developer has reached all of the requirement and got enough finance support. In 
another word, the development is ready to be carried out.  
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9.3 km² (Li, 2002). In other words, less than 16% of land plots supplied to the real 
estate market were actually developed. By the end of 1993, the land leased by the 
municipality has reached almost 30 million square meters, which could supply over 60 
million m² housing space according to the average plot ratio – 2. Based on the current 
amount of annual completed floor space (8 million m²/ year) and rate of sale (50%), 
these apartments could be sold over 14 years (Zheng, 2001). Adjustment for urban 
development thus began in 1997 in Guangzhou. A series of adjustment policies in 
planning control and contraction of monetary supply were implemented to reorganize 
the real estate market.  
 
Most of the land has been leased by negotiation. It is because the land revenues should 
be distributed between the central and municipal government. For example, regulation 
on management of land profit in Guangzhou requires that 5% of land leasing payment 
must be handed over to the central government and 10% must be handed over to the 
provincial government (GLRHB, 1997). As a fixed portion of the land leasing payment 
had to been handed over to the central and provincial government, the municipal 
government would lease the land by negotiation through which the land leasing 
payment was reduced as the exchange of other local benefits. Contrary to the prosperity 
of the negotiation for land leasing, it was not until 1997 that Guangzhou municipality 




Although the local municipality monopolizes the land leasing, it does not control all 
land transfers. Large amount of land is occupied by SOEs and statutory institution users, 
which acquire land on an administration/free allocation basis. Based on the socialist 
land use system in China, the government could hardly retrieve the land from existing 
land users. It was not until the SOE reforms that SOEs started to relocate to urban 
periphery and redevelop the land they occupied. 
 
4.4.3 SOE reforms 
 
When it came to the 1990s and the economic problem of SOEs aggravated, the state finally declared 
that “the aim of the institution reform is to construct a socialistic market” (14th people’s congress, 
1992) and structure of industry was under adjusting. In 1996, the issue of “Plan to optimize the 
capital structure of SOEs” drew up the curtain of the reorganization of industries in 
Guangzhou. Relocation of industry coexists with SOE reform. Reform of SOE assets 
evolves to two categories: 
a. consolidation within trades/ groups. If means that companies with better financial 
situation consolidate those factories which could hardly maintain production. The land 
used by the consolidated factories will be released to the land market. The income from 
land leasing will pay for the consolidation and settlement of workers in the factories. 
b. bankruptcy of those SOEs which could not be reorganized. In this situation, the 
government will retrieve the land used by these SOEs, and lease the land for 
redevelopment. Compensation of workers will be given by the government.  
(Source: Zheng, 2001) 
Restructuring of SOEs within trades released large amount of land to the market for 
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redevelopment. Factories cosolidated and relocated to the outskirt were allowed to 
transfer the land use rights or develop their occupied land. It was not until 2000 that it 
finally became explicit when “Notice for Strengthening the Management on Land Use 
Rights during the SOE Reform” was issued by Guangzhou municipal government. As a 
result of SOE reform, large amount of SOEs were relocated to the urban periphery. For 
instance, in Liwan District, industrial land used to take up 34.8% of the total land area 
and that reduce to less than 15% in 1999 (Zheng, 2001). Land released by the relocation 
of factories went into the land market and was used for real estate development. 
 
4.4.4 Increase of foreign investment in real estate development 
 
To facilitate urban development and redevelopment, aggressive strategies have been 
adopted by the local governments of Chinese cities to invite business and attract 
investment. As one of the sources of investment in urban development, increases in 
foreign-direct investment (FDI) are dramatic since the ‘open door’ policy was issued 
(Kueh, 1992). Being one of the coastal open cities, Guangzhou has attracted much FDI.  
 
FDI is the ‘external’ resource that runs completely outside the traditional channels of 
money movement. For the local state, attracting foreign investment has become crucial 
for the city’s growth. As land leasing can attract investors and contributes to local 
revenues, it becomes one of the main measures that the municipality takes to accelerate 
the urban economic growth. In Guangzhou, foreign investment has been allowed to 
enter the real estate market since the early 1990s. Number of real estate development 
companies with foreign capital grew quickly since then (see Table 4.2). Foreign 
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investors are free actors in the emerging land market. They respond to the real estate 
development market but not the requirement of the local government (see Table 4.3). 
Foreign investment on real estate development reached the peak during the prosperity of 
real estate market in 1996 and quickly reduced since then, which indicated the drop of 
the real estate market. 
Table 4.2 Numbers of Real Estate Developers by Foreign Investment* 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Number 64 200 305 309 327 284 352 410 381 393 
* including Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan         Source: Guangzhou Statistic Bureau, various years 
 
Table 4.3 Foreign Investment on Real Estate Development in Guangzhou Urban 
Districts (million RMB) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Amount 5166.5 6947.0 6008.1 4479.1 2541.0 1989.5 1296.0 1394.3 1028.9
% of total 
investment 
19.8% 32.1% 25.2% 14.8% 8.2% 4.5% 2.8% 2.8% 2.1% 
Source: Guangzhou Statistic Bureau, various years 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter presents the background of urban development in transitional China as 
well as in Guangzhou. Urban development and redevelopment of Guangzhou is 
promoted by the government initiated reforms. After 30 years control of centrally 
planned system and industrial development, the impetus of urban development in 
post-reform era could be boiled down to economic, housing, urban and SOE reforms. 
The local government of Guangzhou was empowered by the decentralization of 
economic decision-making since 1978. In the context of power restructuring, 
Guangzhou municipality also restructured the economy and regained the prosperity of 
its tertiary sectors. Furthermore, the introduction of land leasing system has aroused 
local interests of land redevelopment for economic growth and resulted in extensive 
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redevelopment of centrally located sites.  
 
Due to political constraints, gradualism prevails and leads to trail and error in the 
implementation of new initiatives (Wang, 1994; Zhu, 2005). Old organizations are given 
opportunities to adapt to the new system. In order to carry out the transformation with 
the old actors influencing the institutions, institutional changes are gradual. The 
transitional institutions thus emerge as a link between the out-going central planning 
system and the incoming market mechanisms.  
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Having identified the background of urban building provision, one can attempt to read 
the change of landscape of Chinese cities. The transformation of urban built 
environment in Guangzhou is summarized in this chapter in terms of urban expansion 
and land redevelopment in central areas in time series.  
 
5.2 Physical changes of Guangzhou 
 
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the physical change of Guangzhou city through three 
development periods: industrial development (1949-1977), development of sub-centres 
(1978-1987) and urban restructuring and sprawl (1988-present). Urban expansion and 
land redevelopment are introduced in following sections. 
1 2
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3   city centre 
   industrial development 
   new sub-centre 
 urban sprawl area 
   renewed city centre 
1. industrial development (1949-1977)   2. development of sub-centres (1978-1987) 
3. urban restructuring and sprawl (1988-present)  
Figure 5.1 Evolution of Urban Built Environment in Guangzhou 
 
5.2.1 Limited industrial expansion (1949-1977) 
 
From 1949 to 1978, urban expansion was guided mainly by economic plans set by the 
central government and local urban planning acted rather passively (Xu, 2001). Under 
the control of ‘centrally-planned system’, a project-specific method was developed. Due 
to the socialist land allocation system and tight budget for compensation in 
redevelopment projects, new construction had been placed on vacant land which was 
mostly located in urban peripheries. Development of urban land followed the steps of: 
expansion of industrial land – residential use filling in – commercial and service 
facilities equipping (Wu, 1990). Development surrounded the existing built-up areas 
and formed a belt of expansion. For example, the landscape along the new Industry 
Avenue (Gongye Dadao) in Haizhu District presented plan-led industrialization of 
Guangzhou. However, being a coastal city, Guangzhou was given very low priority in 
receiving industrial investment. Guangzhou was thus maintained as a compact city with 
very little unplanned expansion (Xu & Yeh, 2003). 
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5.2.2 Emerging of sub-centres and development in urban peripheries (1978-1987) 
Guangzhou stepped into a new era of fast urban expansion since the 1980s. Intending to 
increase governmental fiscal revenues, the Guangzhou Municipality initiated measures 
to develop the urban peripheral areas. In its 14th master plan (1984), a three-nuclei 
urban structure was formed (old city center, Tianhe and Whampoa) (Guangzhou Urban 
Planning Bureau, 1984) (see Figure 5.2). The new city blueprint signaled a shift of the 
city’s spatial policy. This master plan set a limit of 250 km² as planning area for 
Guangzhou’s growth up to 2000, rising from 156.45 km² in 1984. This target was 
actually achieved in 1995 (see Table 5.1). During the urban expansion process, 
Guangzhou has evolved from a compact city to a dispersed metropolis. 
Figure 5.2 1984 Master Plan of Guangzhou City 
(GUPB, 1983) 
 
Table 5.1 Guangzhou: Expansion of Urban Built Area (km²) 
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Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1995 
Area 135.96 138.96 142.2 148.35 156.45 162.9 169.72 176 182.25 265.63
Increase rate over 
last year (%) 
2.9 2.2 2.33 2.43 5.46 4.12 4.31 3.58 3.55 7.345 
(GUPB, 1994) 
Large amount of investment had been spent on urban expansion. First, Guangzhou 
seized the opportunity to develop public and CBD facilities in Tianhe when the 6th 
National Games were held in 1987. In the meantime, the municipality invested in 
Guangzhou Economic and Technological Development Zone (ETDZ) in Whampoa, 
providing infrastructure and serviced land under a unified planning method. Situated 32 
km from the city core, the Guangzhou ETDZ has a land area of 9.6 sq km. However, 
although the ETDZ in Whampoa was established as a sub-center, it did not lead to a 
substantial spread of urban development to the new areas. Areas between the old city 
centre and the ETDZ were not filled driven by the market force due to the delay of land 
reform until 1988. 
 
After 1984, Guangzhou City government stopped allocating land to small development 
projects and began to initiate large-scale urban development (Wu & Yeh, 1999). By 
‘comprehensive development’, many large-scale housing projects were being developed 
at the periphery of the city, especially near new suburban sub-centers such as ETDZ as 
large sites and cheaper land were available. ‘Comprehensive development’ is a unified 
approach to acquire land and develop large residential communities in the urban 
periphery. The municipality first acquired land from farmers (collective land owners of 
rural land) and then transferred land to the project concerned parties (Yeh and Wu, 
1996). The new approach can speed up land acquisition through a standard 
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compensation procedure, encouraging various projects to share common facilities and 
allowing SOE land users disengage from direct involvement in land development (Wu, 
1998). However, the ‘comprehensive development’ was not driven by the market 
mechanism. When the urban reform started and the land market emerged, 
comprehensive development has been gradually evolving towards a market-oriented 
way of development. 
 
5.2.3 Rapid real estate development and urban expansion Since 1988 
The land reform in 1988 dramatically changed the speed and pattern of urban 
development in Guangzhou both in terms of urban expansion and land redevelopment. 
With the SOE reform, industry relocation to suburban areas took place at an 
unprecedented rate. Various development zones have been established. Guangzhou’s 
built-up area reached 298 km² (prior to the annexation of Panyu and Huadu) in 2000, far 
exceeding the limit set in the 1984 master plan (Xu & Yeh, 2003). To realize the target 
of “international metropolitan city”, Guangzhou allocated a large amount of land to 
investors, real estate developers, infrastructure construction and provision of public 
projects (GCYEC, 1996). Urban expansion in Guangzhou is driving by plans 
formulated by the municipality with the intention of stimulating local growth (Wu, 
1998).  
 
Of all the development types, real estate development contributed most to the urban 
physical changes. Fast increasing income of residents and the price of commodity 
housing stimulated the development of housing (see Table 5.2, 5.3). The period between 
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1992 and 1995 witnessed the booming of urban real estate development driven by a 
great amount of investment and speculation (see Table 5.4). The number of real estate 
development company rose to 1128 in the end of 1995 from 105 in 1990. There was no 
planning guiding the urban development and the city spread out to all directions out of 
order. It expanded to the extent far exceeding the limit set in the 1984 master plan. 
Rapid urban expansion prompted Urban Planning Bureau of Guangzhou to formulate 
the 15th comprehensive plan for the city in 1994 to enlarge the planned built up area to 
555 km² in 2010 (GUPB, 1994). Spatial structure of the city is planned to have three 
clusters: central, eastern and northern clusters. It was actually trying to rationalize the 
existing spatial patterns of the city (Xu & Yeh, 2003).  
Table 5.2 Increase of Income per capita  
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
income 5281 7188 9118 9940 8768 11256 12019 13967 14694 13380 15003 
Source: Guangzhou Statistic Bureau, various years 
 
Table 5.3 Increase of the Price of Commodity Housing (Yuan) 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
price 3738.6 3156.5 5106.1 4842.3 4303.6 4294.1 4262.3 4200.0 4210.75064.0
Source: Guangzhou Statistic Bureau, various years 
 
Table 5.4 Real Estate Development in Guangzhou (1991-1998) 
 Investment 
(billon Yuan) 
floor space under 
construction 
(thousand m²) 
floor space completed 
(thousand m²) 
 Amount Over last year Amount Over last year Amount Over last year
1991 1.575 31.91% 2472.8 207.83% 1479.5 2.36% 
1992 4.516 186.81% 4667.9 88.77% 2250.6 52.12% 
1993 13.125 190.64% 6390.3 36.90% 3720.0 65.29% 
1994 18.945 51.27% 7340.9 14.88% 4610.0 23.92% 
1995 20.911 10.38% 6400.0 -14.70% 5107.7 10.80% 
1996 22.916 9.59% 5264.8 -21.56% 6122.6 19.87% 
1997 23.742 3.60% 5339.9 1.43% 6549.1 6.97% 
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1998 26.878 13.21% 7555.0 41.48% 7563.0 15.48% 
(Li, 2002) 
Adjustment for urban development began in 1997 in Guangzhou. A series of adjustment 
policies in planning control and contraction of monetary supply were implemented to 
reorganize the real estate market. Since 1998, another upsurge of real estate 
development has been observed (see Table 5.4). 
 
Since 2000, the local government also leased large amounts of rural land along the 
highways to draw the developer’s investment. In Guangzhou, large-sized housing estates 
began spreading out in suburban areas along Southern China Expressway. Related low 
land acquisition fee makes it possible for the developers to acquire large amount of land 
to pool and develop. To meet with the requirement of general social life and to attract 
residents, developers provide all kinds of facilities such as buses, schools, sports 
amenities, supermarkets and sometimes even hospitals which make the communities 
almost independent towns. Independent large scale estate projects on rural land in 
suburban areas introduced a new landscape into Guangzhou and the development style 
quick spread over the whole country. 
 
Rapid development also brought a new urban landscape – urban villages – in inner 
Guangzhou which are enclaves of rural settlements within the urban built-up area (Zhu, 
2002). They are composed of land parcels of “homeland” for those peasants to build 
houses for their own accommodation, and land plots for them to carry out 
nonagricultural economic activities which can keep them self-employed. By 2004, there 
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were 139 urban villages in Guangzhou (Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau, 2004). 
 
Rent of private housing units to the migrants becomes the main source of villagers’ 
incomes. Having seen a rising demand for housing from low-income migrants who 
come to search for jobs in the fast developing city, villagers started to construct 
apartment buildings for rent. Illegal constructions encroach upon open spaces, 
minimizing the space between buildings. High density and complicated background of 
the residents in the urban villages bring many environmental and social problems to the 
central city of Guangzhou. 
 
5.2.4 Recent Urban Development Issues 
 
Guangzhou is now losing its dominancy in Southern China due to the development of 
other cities, which challenges the functions of Guangzhou as the centre of commerce, 
finance, manufacturing, tourist and information in southern China (Xu & Yeh, 2003). 
The Guangzhou municipality is now trying to change the situation by strengthening its 
urban development. A multi-centre structure is adopted, calling for “expansion in the 
south, optimisation in the north, advance in the east, and linkage in the west”. A 
comprehensive and speedy transportation network in the Pearl River Delta is planned to 
provide easier access to other cities (Xu & Yeh, 2003).  
 
Resetting the strategic objective of the urban development as a “regional central city in 
the world with a high level of prosperity, efficiency and civilization” (Xu & Yeh, 2003), 
Guangzhou is now aiming at “minor change in a year; medium change in three years; 
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and great change in 5 years”. A total amount of US$ 7.25 billion has been invested by 
the government for urban construction from 1999 to 2002 and Guangzhou was awarded 
the “United Nations’ Best Improvement of Human Settlement” in 2002 (see Figure 5.5). 
To develop the city into a liveable metropolis by 2010, the government will invest US$ 
12.8 billion in the next 5 years (Xu & Yeh, 2003). However, Guangzhou has a long way 
to go to reach the objective of a livable ecological city that is favorable to business 
initiatives. 
 
Figure 5.3 Guangzhou in Present 
Source: www.googleimage.com
 
5.3 Land redevelopment in Guangzhou 
 
With the brief introduction of the overall picture of the physical changes in Guangzhou, 
land redevelopment issues are highlighted in this section to provide the background of 
the case study.  
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During the first three decades after the liberation, the absence of land prices removed all 
incentives to redevelopment of the built-up areas, which resulted in a land use freeze. 
There was little urban redevelopment in the city centre as the newly established socialist 
state could not afford the cost of relocating the residents and carrying out substantial 
urban redevelopment (Wu & Yeh, 1997). Central areas of Guangzhou thus suffered from 
dilapidated and overcrowded housing and a deteriorated environment. By the end of 
1985, there were about 3.2 million inhabitants in the city and most of them were living 
in the old city centre. The central urban area of Guangzhou comprised only 21% of the 
urban space but 60% of the city’s population (Xu & Yeh, 2003). At the beginning of the 
economic reforms, provision of urban housing and urban restructure, therefore, became 
the most urgent tasks for Guangzhou. 
 
5.3.1 From 1978 to 1987 
The initial purpose of urban redevelopment was to improve residents’ housing 
conditions and redevelop the deteriorated built environment. Housing reconstruction 
and infrastructure improvement were the major objectives of urban redevelopment (He 
& Wu, 2005). Governments intended to carry out urban redevelopment under local 
government- enterprise coalitions (Zhu, 1999). For example, together with some 
designated developers, Guangzhou municipality set the urban renewal plan for Jinhuajie 
in Liwan District and Dongfengjie in Yuexiu District, which were expected to become 
the example of urban redevelopment. The redevelopment process of these projects 
actually moved very slowly due to the huge cost of relocation and severe financial 
deficiency of the government and REDCs. What also hampered the redevelopment was 
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that the land market had not been developed and existing land users stood firmly on 
their occupied land.  
 
However, the transformation of housing production mechanisms had brought extensive 
redevelopment into the central areas, although large scale urban renewal was not yet 
affordable for the local government. Spontaneous residential development with no 
layout plan by danweis could be found here and there in the central area of Guangzhou. 
 
5.3.2 From 1988 to present 
Since the urban reforms, housing provision and infrastructure improvement were no 
longer the only targets of urban development. Promoting local economy growth, 
restructuring urban spaces and transforming urban functions are also among the 
multiple objectives. To create a favorable environment for attracting inward capital, and 
also to make capability visible to the central state, the local state shows great zeal for 
city place remaking through urban redevelopment (He & Wu, 2005). Despite high cost 
and difficulties in urban redevelopment, the great potential of commercial profits has 
attracted more and more domestic and foreign investors and developers (see Table 5.5). 
New commercial and residential buildings have been built to replace the dilapidated 
neighborhood and industrial areas in the central city. Obtaining land use rights from the 
local government and transforming the dilapidated neighborhoods and factories into 
high-profiled properties became highly profitable and attracted a great amount of 
investment. In the urban area, developers completed RMB￥42.79 billion development 
during the period from 1990 to 1995 with the annual increasing rate of 83.9% on 
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average. Floor space completed in this period was 17.2 million m² (10.4 million m² in 
urban areas) which is 2.21 times of the total completed area in last 5 years (GCYEC, 
1996). ‘Modern’ high-rise residential and commercial complexes were introduced with 
a high density and efficient land use.  
Table 5.5 Investment in Capital construction and Real estate development in urban 
area (8 districts) of Guangzhou (million Yuan) 




1952 32.55  
1957 152.64  
1962 68.11  
1965 187.18  
1970 185.75  
1975 495.72  
1978 615.47  
1980 741.26  
1985 1891.55 444.52 
1990 3306.49 975.41 
1995 17869.62 17024.58 
2000 30033.84 34660.68 
2001 31102.31 37650.93 
2002 26548.74 40111.12 
                                    (GSB, 2003: 104) 
 
5.4 Summary of Guangzhou’s Development 
 
The efforts of Guangzhou to revitalizing the city have created significant results. Urban 
physical transitions in Guangzhou were drastic in both the urban expansion and land 
redevelopment, both of which demonstrated the interaction between the government’s 
management and the emerging urban land market. It is understood that the physical 
transition is led by a series of institutions evolved in the transition as a link between the 
                                                        
10 Investment on Capital Construction refers to the new construction projects and the extension projects of SOEs, 
institutions or administrative units mainly for the purpose of expanding production capacity or improving project 
efficiency. 
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out-going central planning system and the incoming market mechanisms. During the 
1980s, the urban expansion of Guangzhou was greatly interfered by the government 
plan. Real estate markets began acting as a strong booster in remaking Guangzhou’s 
landscape since the urban reform in 1988. The dynamics of development and 
redevelopment in Guangzhou have experienced several waves, indicating the evolution 
of the institutions. 
 
However, with the brief introduction of Guangzhou’s land redevelopment, how land 
redevelopment of Guangzhou has been evolved is still vague. The following Chapters 
make use of the empirical case of Jinhuajie’s redevelopment for an in-depth analysis of 
the transitional institutions by analyzing property rights structures and describing 
resulted land redevelopment characteristics.  
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 6 LAND REDEVELOPMENT IN JINHUAJIE 




Chapters 6 and 7 make use of the empirical case of Jinhuajie’s redevelopment for an 
in-depth analysis of the evolution of land redevelopment characteristics and institutions. 
This chapter examines the evolution of land redevelopment in Jinhuajie in terms of 
redevelopment characteristics. Once being a typical area of high-density urban centre 
with a large amount of dilapidated neighborhoods and industrial areas, Jinhuajie 
experienced a complicated process of land redevelopment. This study covers the period 
from 1978 to present, during which period the land redevelopment characteristics, types 
and processes have been changing over time.  
6.2 Rapid Land Redevelopment: Change of the Built Environment in Jinhuajie 
6.2.1 Built environment in the early 1980s 
In the early 1980s, land use types in Jinhuajie included residential (41.76% of the total 
land), commercial, industrial (26.18% of the total land), public utilities, storage, urban 
infrastructures, and a small area of agricultural (vegetable) land (see Figure 6.1). In 
Jinhuajie, over 11.4 ha of land in the west part were occupied by factories and small 
handicraft workshops scattered throughout the whole area. Besides the industrial areas, 
most street blocks in Jinhuajie were divided by individual land users into small parcels 
for private houses (see Figure 6.2). Lacking in maintenance for over 30 years, the 
majority of neighborhoods in Jinhuajie were aged and dilapidated and the urban 
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landscape was extremely rundown. The width of most streets and lanes within Jinhuajie 
ranges from 2 to 3 meters, which made it very difficult for fire engines and ambulance 
to pass. The population density in Jinhuajie was as high as 67,215 person/ km² (Wei, 
1997). At the beginning of the period of economic reform from 1978, urban 
redevelopment of Jinhuajie, therefore, became one of the most urgent tasks for the local 
government. 
 
Houses in Jinhuajie belong to three different types of owners: the state (including the 
Real Estate Administration Bureau (REAB) of the local municipality and danwei), 
Overseas Chinese and local private households, whose building floor areas respectively 
account for 11%, 4% and 85% of the total (GUPB, 1983).  
Figure 6.1 Land Use in Jinhuajie in early 1980s 
 
(Wei, 1997: 51) 
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Figure 6.2 Maps of Jinhuajie in the early 1980s 
Source: maps in Guangzhou Urban Planning & Design Survey Research Institute 
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6.2.2 Current built environment 
 
Being a typical area of high-density urban centre with a large amount of 
dilapidated neighborhoods and industrial areas, Jinhuajie experienced a 
complicated but rapid process of land redevelopment. 92 projects have been 
completed since 1980. Jinhuajie has changed from a dilapidated residential area 
with concentrated light industries to an area of commodity housing, commercial 
buildings, offices and modern infrastructures (see Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4). However, 
the aspiration of urban redevelopment to reduce building and population densities 
has not been achieved. The population density has increased to about 80,000 
person/ km² (officials in jiedao banshishu, interview, Oct. 14, 2004). Figure 6.6 
shows the overall changes of the built environment in Jinhuajie. 
Figure 6.3 Land Use in 1999 
 
Source: Urban Plan of Liwan District (1999)  
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Figure 6.4 Aerial Map of Jinhuajie in 2000 
Source: Arial maps in Guangzhou Land Resource and Housing Bureau (2000) 
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Figure 6.5 Redevelopment Projects in Jinhuajie from 1980 to 2004 
Source: record of Planning Permission in GUPB (accessed in June, 2004), maps in 
Guangzhou Urban Planning & Design Survey Research Institute, maps in Liwan Urban 
Planning Bureau 
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6.3 Evolution of Urban Redevelopment Modes in Jinhuajie 
Following the institutional changes in the transition, there have been three development 
types in Jinhuajie sequentially during 20 years of redevelopment. For each type of 
redevelopment, different actors have been involved. 
1. housing, workshops and offices developed by danweis for their own use 
Scattered construction in Jinhuajie was first carried out by danweis spontaneously in the 
1980s, providing housing, workshops and offices for their own use.  
2. comprehensive large scale urban redevelopment projects 
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, comprehensive large scale urban redevelopment 
projects were carried out in Jinhuajie as pilot projects of urban redevelopment in 
Guangzhou. There are three kinds of developers involved in Jinhuajie redevelopment 
projects: government subordinated REDCs, foreign and domestic private developers. 
3. redevelopment of SOE’s land 
Since 1996, industry relocation invited more actors to join the urban redevelopment of 
Jinhuajie. Jinhuajie became one of the pilot areas of industrial land redevelopment in 
the late 1990s. Development of SOE’s land was carried out by SOE and domestic 
developers within which both group subordinated REDCs and private developers were 
involved. 
 
6.3.1 Housing, workshops and offices developed by danweis for their own use 
 
This type of building provision was mainly carried out in the 1980s when the land 
market was not legally constructed but the economic reform had started. Increase in the 
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provision of housing, workshops and offices by danwei in the 1980s indicated the 
reform of housing commercialization and the rise of Self-raised Funds (SRFs). 17 
projects were developed by danweis in Jinhuajie (see Table 6.1, Figure 6.6). 
 
Within these 17 cases, there were two types of redevelopment.  
1. Three of the projects (No. 1, 2, 3) were carried out on danwei’s land.  
2. For others (No. 4 - 17), the construction units acquired land from the sitting 
residents  




Table 6.1 Housing and Offices Development by daiwei 
 
No Construction unit Use type Year 
1 Hongfeng Lock Factory housing 1980 
2,3 2nd Headquarters of Housing and Construction Office housing 1980 
4 Guangzhou Camera Equipment Factory workshop 1980 
5 Guangzhou Dyeing and Weaving Industry housing 1980 
6 Guangzhou Gardening Company workshop 1980 
7 Guangzhou Board of Health office 1981 
8 Guangzhou Weaving Bureau housing 1982 
9 Guangzhou Bicycle Company housing 1982 
10 Guangzhou Power Bureau Guangzhou Mend Plant  housing  1982 
11 Guangdong Friendship Company housing 1982 
12 Bicycle Chain Guard Factory storage 1984 
13 Guangzhou Ocean Petroleum Taxation Bureau Office/ housing 1985 
14 Guangzhou Lamp Plant workshop 1985 
15 2nd Light Industry Development Company Office/ housing 1987 
16 Guangzhou Judicatory Bureau and 4th Standard Accessory Factory housing 1989 
17 Guangzhou Food Bureau housing 1990s 
Source: record of Planning Permission in GUPB (accessed in June, 2004), Urban 
Planning Bureau Liwan Branch (accessed on Oct. 14, 2004)
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Figure 6.6 Housing, workshops and offices development by daiwei 
Source: record of Planning Permission in GUPB, Urban Planning Bureau Liwan Branch, 
maps in Guangzhou Urban Planning & Design Survey Research Institute 
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Initially in the 1980s, the redevelopment process started with the project approvals from 
the municipal planning bureau – Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau (GUPB), the 
supervising bureau (headquarter of the industrial group) and the local planning 
commission. For the projects carried out on danweis’ own land such as Project 1-3 in 
Table 6.1, the danweis had already held the Land Use Certificate. They could start the 
construction after obtaining Design Outlines which served as planning control. In many 
cases, projects were allowed to be carried out without the issue of any Design Outlines. 
Planning control over development was weak during the 1980s according to the author’s 
interviews to the officials in GUPB. 
 
When the needed land sites were occupied by other land users, danweis which planned 
to construct had to acquire land from the original land users (Project 4-17 in Table 6.1). 
After the danwei obtained the approval from GUPB, the supervising bureau and local 
planning commission, a Land Requisition Location Note (LRLN) would be issued by 
GUPB as the demolition and relocation permit and the notice would be sent by Real 
Estate Administration Bureau (REAB) to inform related departments. 14 projects (No. 4 
- 17) in Jinhuajie with changing land users from private households to danwei have 
been carried out successfully. 
 
However, as Case A in Figure 6.7 showed, one danwei might fail in acquiring the land 
when the land was occupied by the other danwei, which might be due to the socialist 
land use rights of danweis. Guangzhou Normal College received the planning 
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permission to redevelop the land used by the 1st Manufactory in 1985. But it failed in 
the negotiation with the 1st Manufactory and the construction was thus not implemented.  
 
Once a LRLN was issued, the construction unit and the affected residents or danwei 
were required to sign detailed resettlement and compensation contracts. After signing 
the contracts of demolition and resettlement, the construction units could turn to GUPB 
for the Land Requisition Approval and Design Outlines. After the demolition, 
resettlement and compensation are settled, and the construction units could get Land 
Use Certificate as the certification of using the land. 
 
6.3.2 Comprehensive Large Scale Redevelopment Projects 
Following the dynamic economic growth in the 1980s and the urban reform initiated in 
1988, Guangzhou municipality was looking for opportunities to carry out large scale 
urban redevelopment. Being a typical central area with high population density and 
dilapidated living environment, Jinhuajie was chosen by the municipality as the test 
case of urban redevelopment. In 1988, the Guangzhou Municipal Construction 
Commission and three REDCs – Guangzhou Liwan Urban Construction Development 
Company (LUCDC), Xiguan Development Company (XDC) and Lihua Real Estate 
Management Company (LREMC) – signed an agreement to conduct Jinhuajie 
redevelopment project. Land leasehold was given to the REDCs at no payment to the 
government. An area of 29 hectares had been divided to 27 land parcels for 
redevelopment (Construction Bureau of Liwan District, 1988). However, only 24 
parcels have been developed by the REDCs (see Figure 6.7). The redevelopment of the 
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whole area was expected to be accomplished within 5.5 years (September, 1988 – 
February, 1994). 
Figure 6.7 Allocation of the Parcels for Urban Redevelopment Project 
 
Source: file in Construction Bureau of Liwan District (accessed in June, 2004) 
 
There are 57 buildings provided on 24 land parcels. 12 buildings are commodity 
housing or offices, 1 building is a government office and the rest (44 buildings) are 
resettlement housing. Most of the resettlement housings have been provided as 9-storey 
buildings in order to minimize the cost as the buildings with storey less than 9 were not 
required to equip lifts before 1997 (see Table 6.2, Figure 6.8). What results in is that the 
total floor areas of the resettlement housing (282,000 m²) are even less than those of the 
commodity housing (285,680 m²) although the number of buildings of the former is 
much more than that of the latter. 169,000 m² of floor areas are provided as on-site and 
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off-site public facilities (Construction Bureau of Liwan District, 1989) (see Table 6.3). 
Commodity housing and offices, on-site resettlement housing and public facilities 
compose the new urban built environment of Jinhuajie. 





Land Use Type Construction period* 
1 Commodity housing N/A – under construction
2 Commodity housing 
& office  
1997 – N/A 
3 Resettlement housing 1994 – 1997 
P1,2 
4 Commodity housing 
& office 
1992 – 1995 
5 Resettlement housing 1991 – N/A 
6 Resettlement housing 1991 – N/A 
7 Resettlement housing 1991 – N/A 
8 Resettlement housing 1992 –1999 
P3 
9 Resettlement housing 1996 – N/A 
10 Resettlement housing 1993 – 1997 
11 Resettlement housing 1993 – under construction
P4 
12 Resettlement housing 1993 – under construction
P5 13 Resettlement housing 1992 – 1993  
14 Commodity housing 
& office 
1995 – 1997  P6 
15 Resettlement housing 1996 – 1999  
P7 16 Resettlement housing 1996 – 1999  
17 Commodity & 
Resettlement housing 




18 court N/A 
19 Resettlement housing 1988 – 1997  
20 Resettlement housing 1989 – 1997 
21 Resettlement housing 1990 – 1997 
22 Resettlement housing 1990 – 1997 
23 Resettlement housing 1990 – 1997 
P9 
24 Resettlement housing 1991 – 1997 
P10,11,12 25 Commodity housing 1999 – under construction
26 Resettlement housing 1989 – 1994  
27 Resettlement housing 1991 – 1998 
28 Resettlement housing 1991 – 1998 
29 Resettlement housing 1991 – 1998  
LUCDC 
P13 
30 Resettlement housing 1994 – 1998  
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31 Resettlement housing 1993 – 1999  
32 Resettlement housing 1993 – 1999  
33 Commodity housing 1993 – 2001  
34 Resettlement housing 1996 – 1999  
P14 
35 Resettlement housing N/A 
36 Commodity housing 1993 – N/A  
37 Resettlement housing 1993 – 1999  
38 Resettlement housing 1993 – 1999 
39 Resettlement housing 1996 – N/A 
40 Resettlement housing 1996 – N/A 
P15 
41 Resettlement housing 1996 – N/A 
42 Resettlement housing 1991 – N/A P16 
43 Commodity housing 1993 – N/A 
P17 44 Commodity housing N/A – under construction 
P18 45 Commodity housing 
& office 
1993 – N/A 
P19 46 
XDC 
Commodity housing 1995 – 1999 
47 Resettlement housing 1991 – 1999 
48 Resettlement housing 1992 – 1999 
P20 
49 Resettlement housing 1997 – N/A 
50 Resettlement housing 1986 – N/A P21 
51 Resettlement housing 1986 – N/A 
52 Resettlement housing 1995 – 1999 P22, 23 
53 Resettlement housing 1995 – 2001 
54 Resettlement housing N/A 
55 
P24 
Resettlement housing N/A 
56 Resettlement housing N/A 
57 Resettlement housing N/A 
 *: Years listed as completion time is the record of the time that the planning bureau checks the buildings. In Guangzhou, the 
planning bureau checks the buildings after the construction is completed.  
Source: records of Planning Permission in GUPB, Urban Planning Bureau Liwan 
Branch and author’s survey 
 
Table 6.3 Projects in Jinhuajie’s Urban Redevelopment Project 
Land Use Type Construction Area Proportion 
Resettlement housing 282,000 m² 38.3% 
Commodity housing & office 285,680 m² 38.8% 
169,000 m² Public facility 22.9% 
Source: “Budget of Urban Redevelopment project of Jinhuajie (1999)”, files in 




Figure 6.8 REDC’s Redevelopment in Jinhuajie (Redevelopment Projects) 
Source: record of Planning Permission in GUPB (accessed in June, 2004), Urban 
Planning Bureau Liwan Branch, maps in Guangzhou Urban Planning & Design Survey 
Research Institute (accessed in June, 2004) and author’s survey 
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By exploring the redevelopment process of large-scale redevelopment projects of 
Jinhuajie, this study reveals the behaviors of residents, local government and 
developers. 
6.3.2.1 Compensation to residents 
On-site resettlement to residents 
After REDCs received required permissions, the process of Jinhuajie’s redevelopment 
projects started from demolition and compensation to the involved residents. Residents 
were on-site resettled. The REDCs met with each and every household and negotiated 
with them a precise settlement in terms of the resettlement housing, temporary shelters 
and other compensation. Following the standards set in “Guideline to Implementation of 
Urban Demolition and Resettlement in Guangzhou” (1992), the three REDCs resettled 
7492 households in on-site resettlement housing (interview to officials in Urban 
Planning Bureau of Liwan District on Oct. 14, 2004). 44 resettlement buildings have 
been provided in Jinhuajie, accounting for 38.3% of the total construction area. 
 
The most burdensome resettlement occurred with the occupants of housing owned by 
Overseas Chinese (about 100 house units, interview to manager in LUCDC on Apr. 7, 
2005). Overseas Chinese owned housing was allocated to tenants during the 1950s and 
1960s. Specifically in Guangzhou, the Overseas Chinese owned housing units had to be 
replaced twice in any redevelopment projects since the 1980s— once to provide new 
housing managed by the municipality to the tenant and once to provide the Overseas 
Chinese with a replacement for their demolished unit.  
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 During the provision of on-site resettlement housing, it is observed that developers tend 
to have problems in raising development finance in time and in sufficient amounts. 
Provision of resettlement housings is severely delayed. With 45 resettlement housing 
projects only 2 of them had been completed within the time limit (by 1994). 21 projects 
have cost more than 5 years to complete. In addition, to cut down the cost, the REDCs 
tend to construct resettlement housings as 9-storey brick-made buildings11 and the 
quality of resettlement housing is much lower than the commodity housing constructed 
in Jinhuajie (see Figure 6.9).  
 
Figure 6.9 Quality of Resettlement Housing and Commodity Housing 
 
Above: on-site resettlement housing 
Right: commodity housing (Ximenkou Square) 
 
Source: photos taken by the author in August, 
2004 
 
Compensation for temporary settlement, moving and delay of the projects
Besides on-site resettlement, all concerned households have also received extra payment 
                                                        
11 It is regulated that lift is not required in buildings with 9 or less storeys in Guangzhou till 1996. 
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for moving expenses, temporary shelters, temporary shutout, etc. As shown in Table 6.4, 
the developers had to cover all the expenses for moving and temporary settlement. The 
standard of the compensation actually kept rising with the economic growth.   
Table 6.4 Compensation of Moving Expenses and Temporary Settlement in Jinhuajie 
 Price (￥/person) Price (￥/Household)
Initiate Fee for moving (residential)  400 
Compensation to moving expense  200 
 600 Initiate Fee for moving (commercial) 
 800 Compensation to moving expense 
Compensation of temp shutout  
(commercial use house) 
 45000 
Rent for temp shelter Covered by the REDCs  
Fees for staying with relatives 45 per month  
Transportation fee for temp shelter 15 - 45 per month  
Source: “budget of Urban Redevelopment project of Jinhuajie (1989)”, files in 
Construction Bureau of Liwan District (accessed on Oct. 18, 2004) 
 
The residents would also be paid for the delay of redevelopment projects, if it is the case 
–compensation listed in Table 6.4 would rise to 150% of the originally expected amount. 
In some cases, the figure rose up to 200% (interview to manager of LREMC on Nov. 7, 
2004 and manager of LUCDC on Apr. 7, 2005). The delay charge actually became a big 
burden to the developers as the demolition was completed very early but the new 
construction did not catch the pace in most projects. LUCDC once paid ￥5 million a 
year as the extra delay charge (interview to manager of LUCDC on Apr. 7, 2005). 
 
6.3.2.2 Provision of public facilities 
Required by the government, the REDCs had to provide public facilities to the local 
government. During the redevelopment, the REDCs were required to provide public 
facilities to serve the whole Jiedao, district or even the whole city. Development of 
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infrastructure accounted for a significant cost in the whole redevelopment project and 
were finally transferred free of charge or at very low cost to the local government. In 
Jinhuajie, besides the infrastructures serving the whole Jiedao, the REDCs provided 
assembled land for the construction of Kangwan Road at no cost to the municipality and 
provided the new office for Liwan Court12 (by LREMC alone) at very low cost (see 
Table 6.5; Figure 6.10). 
 
Table 6.5 Budget of Provision of Public Facilities in Jinhuajie’s redevelopment project 
 




Water supply 15,000 
Power supply 30,000 
Drainage 24,240 
Urban infrastructure  
Total 83,790
primary school 1,907.15Public amenities 
 1,805.65nursery school 
1,153.6culture Station 
400.4sanatorium for elders 
192offices for Jiedao  
256electricity modification rooms 
175Public toilets 
garbage collecting stations 115





                                                        
12 The Liwan Court paid 1.5 million Yuan to LH which is said not enough to cover the cost of 
demolition, let along the cost of construction (source: interview).
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Source: “budget of Urban Redevelopment project of Jinhuajie (1989)”, file in 
Construction Bureau of Liwan District, accessed on Oct. 18, 2004 and Maps in GUPB, 
(accessed in June, 2004) 
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6.3.2.3 Development of commodity housing 
Due to the limited funds of the REDCs, redevelopment projects were planned to be 
financed through the sale of marketable commercial units when they were initiated. 
Taking fees and taxes, construction costs and urban infrastructure costs into 
consideration, the total cost per marketable residential area was estimated at ￥2592/ 
m² which was far more above the sale price of commodity housing in Jinhuajie (1,300 / 
m² in 1989) (Wei, 1997) and other comparable commodity housing in Guangzhou 
(between ￥1,700 to ￥2,400 / m² in 1992) (World Bank, 1993). It was not until 1991 
when restriction on real estate prices was relaxed that the price of commodity housing 
rose dramatically in the first upsurge of real estate of development. 
 
Profitable redevelopment projects attracted foreign developers and domestic investors 
with the capital that REDCs lacked. Development of some commodity housing and 
offices were thus carried out in the form of joint venture between the REDCs and 
investors. For each commodity housing or office project, a project company formed by 
the local REDC and investor would be established to take charge of the development 
(see Table 6.5).  
 
Foreign investment in real estate development in Guangzhou urban area reduced 
dramatically when the trough in the real estate market emerged in 1995. Foreign 
investment started to disengage from Jinhuajie’s redevelopment projects. In addition to 
that, the REDCs were eager to obtain the capital for on-site resettlement housing 
development so as to reduce the amount of delay charge. Transfer of leasehold of land 
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parcels with pre-set planning control parameters was adopted (see Table 6.6). 
 
Table 6.6 Commodity Housing and Office Projects in Jinhuajie 
No. in Figure 6.8 Project name REDC Foreign/ private developer 
Joint-venture 
2 Heyou Mansion LREMC Jifeng (HK) 
4 Liwan Mansion LREMC Jifeng (HK) 
14 Jinping Mansion LREMC Construction Commission of 
Kaiping City 
33 Jinhuayuan LUCDC Weiye (HK) 
Kangwangge LUCDC Changjian (HK) 36 
Jinxi Mansion LUCDC N/A 43 
Likang Mansion LUCDC Nanya (HK) 44 
45 Jinxin Mansion XDC Xinlian (HK) 
46 Gangfeng Mansion XDC N/A 
Transfer of land leasehold 
1 Liqingju  LREMC Wanji (HK) 
17 Jiachengyuan LREMC Suiyin (GD) 
25 Ximenkou Square LW Yingfa (HK) 
Source: interview to manager of LREMC on Nov. 7, 2004, Apr. 8, 2005 and manager of 
LUCDC on Apr. 7, 2005 
 
6.3.2.4 Flexible planning control 
Often, planning procedures and operations are discretionarily explained and 
manipulated by the government in the transitional China (Xu, 2001). This phenomenon 
has also been observed in urban redevelopment in Jinhuajie. 
 
In the comprehensive redevelopment projects, Land Use Plan of Jinhuajie (1988) 
defined how land parcels should be developed. Land Use Plan was approved by Liwan 
Urban Planning Bureau as the statutory document to control the redevelopment of 
Jinhuajie area. Based on resettlement requirement, environment capacity and the 
expected gain of redevelopment projects, the Land Use Plan defined the allowed land 
 119
use type and maximum plot ratio for each parcel. 
 
In practice, prior planning permissions were required for development of each parcel. 
Development application for each parcel was evaluated by the GUPB and a Planning 
Permission would be issued with land use planning parameters attached such as land use 
and plot ratio. By study both the Land Use Plan of Jinhuajie and the Planning 
Permission of each parcels, it has been discovered that discrepancies were 
overwhelming in terms of the land use type and plot ratio (see Table 6.7). 
 
Table 6.7 Change of Plot Ratio of Parcels* 
Parcels with discrepancies in plot ratio (8 parcels)  
Parcel No. Original Plot Ratio Current Plot Ratio 
1,2 2.5 4.74 
4 2.0 2.25
7 2.6 4.0
10,11,12 2.5 6.08 
21 2.1 3.0
Not Known (16 parcels) 
 
Parcels with discrepancies in land use (6 parcels)  
Parcel No. Original land use Current land use
1,2 office Commodity housing
10,11,12 office Commodity housing




Parcels without discrepancies (18 parcels) 
* parcel numbers refer to Figure 6.8. 
   Source: GUPB files (accessed in August, 2004) 
An in-depth interview unveils that the REDCs did not pay any extra land leasing 
payment for the increase of plot ratio or the change of land use (interview to Mr. Shao 
& Mr. Cao, referring to Appendix I). “The resettlement was costly, especially when the 
construction of resettlement housing is delayed due to the market problem. High 
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compensation for the temporary shelter and delay of resettlement became a heavy 
burden for us. Liwan Urban Construction Co. once paid 5 million a year for the delay 
charge. The plot ratio was too low for REDCs to cover the cost. If the government 
didn’t offer any help, the redevelopment projects could not go on. And this result was 
not what the government wanted to see. And as you know, we were in a close 
relationship with the local government, some of our managers were sent by the local 
government. For us, we just requested to the Construction Commision and Urban 
Planning Bureau of Liwan District. I myself once worked in the Urban Planning Bureau 
of Liwan District, we changed the plot ratio or land use type for the developers after 
bargaining.” said the Vice manager of Liwan Urban Construction Co.  
 
6.3.3 Development of SOE’s land 
In 1996, the issue of “Blueprint for the Implementation of Experiments to optimize 
Capital Structure of Guangzhou” drew up the curtain of the relocation of industries in 
Guangzhou. SOE reform started to rearrange the resource within industrial groups and 
large amount of factories are closed or relocated to urban peripheral areas. In Jinhuajie, 
there are 6 large factories located in the west part due to the industry development from 
1949 to 1978, occupying 11 land parcels. Since 1996, these factories have been either 
relocated or closed and their occupied land plots are released for redevelopment (see 
Table 6.8). The local government also tried to push the relocation of SOEs and 
redevelopment of their occupied land because of environment protection. In 1995, “the 
approval of the relocation of Quanxin Knitting Factory for environmental protection” 
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was issued by Guangzhou Environment Protection Bureau to suggest one factory in 
Jinhuajie to relocate. In 1997, the government of Guangzhou issued “Environmental 
Protection Plan of Guangzhou” which requires 68 factories that produce heavy pollution 
to move out of the urban areas. In Jinhuajie, 4 factories had been listed in the 68 factories. 
Requirement of environment protection increased the cost of production in central areas 
and objectively stimulated industries to relocate. 
 
Within 5 year, all industrial land in Jinhuajie has changed from industrial use to 
residential or commercial use (see Table 6.9, Table 6.10, Figure 6.11). Redevelopments 
of SOE’s land in Jinhuajie seem complicated and different from case to case (see Table 
6.8). 
 
Table 6.8 Reform of SOEs in Jinhuajie 
Factory Present status Supervisory Industrial Group 
Quanxin Knitting Plant (A) Incorporated and relocated to 
Huadu Town 
Guangzhou Weaving Group (GWG) 
Guangzhou Silk Printing Plant 
(B) 
Incorporated and relocated to 
Haizhu District 
Guangzhou Weaving Group (GWG) 
Guangzhou Taisheng Dyeing & 
Weaving Factory (C) 
Incorporated and relocated  Guangzhou Weaving Group (GWG) 
1st Manufactory (D) incorporated and relocated to 
Huadu Town 
Guangzhou Motor Generator Group 
(GMGG)
Guangzhou Food Company (E) 
Abattoir 
closed Guangzhou Food Group (GFG) 












Table 6.9 Redevelopment of SOE’s Land 
Parcel No Original 
land user 
Mode of land disposal New land use Initiate time Complete 
time 
1 Factory A joint-venture with GWG Jinlun Real 




2 Factory A joint-venture with GWG Jinlun Real 




3 Factory A asset transfer to Huaxia Kanglong Co. commercial 2001 2001 
4 Factory A joint-venture with GWG Jinlun Real 





5 Factory A Change of land use office N/A N/A 
6 Factory B asset transfer to Linan Art Institute education N/A N/A 





8 Factory D asset transfer to Guangzhou Traffic 
Artificer School 
education 2002 2002 











11 Factory F Change of land use as Liwan Electric 
Equipment Market
commercial N/A 
Source: files in GUPB archive (accessed in June, 2004) & author’s survey 
 
 





Area 1st attempt to redevelop result 2nd attempt result 3rd  attempt result 
A 1 2734 m² Apply for housing development 
(1993)  
Approved by 
GUPB but not 
carried out 
Factory A redeveloped the land as 
commodity housing (Jinlun Mansion) 
together with GWG Jinlun Real Estate 




 2 3305 m² Factory A redevelop the land as 
commodity housing (Jinnu 
Mansion) together with GWG 





 3 N/A Rebuilt and enlarged the 




The asset was transferred to Huaxia 
Kanglong Co. and transformed to a 
shopping centre. Huaxiakanglong was 
responsible for Factory A’s debt and 
had to pay for the land leasing 
payment 
 4 2757 m² Factory A redevelop the land as 
commodity housing 
(Huakangyuan) together with 
GWG Jinlun Real Estate 
Development Co. 
Approved by 
GUPB in 1999 and 
till now the project 
has not been 
completed. 
 5 N/A Redecorated and changed the 
land use type 
Currently used as 
Quanxin Business 
Centre 
B 6 3599 m² Land use type changes from 
workshop to commercial use 
(1996) 
Approved by 
GUPB but not 
carried out due to 
financial problem 
Factory B redevelop the land as 
commercial building with commodity 
housing together with GWG Jinlun 
Real Estate Development Co. & 
Guangzhou Hailang Development Co. 
Failed due to 
financial 
problem 
Factory B transferred 
the asset to Linan Art 






C 7 2625 m² +
3217 m² 
Parcel 1 (3217 m²) was expected 
to redevelop for commercial and 
office use with Jinlun; Parcel 2 
(2625 m²) was redevelop- ed 
with Anye Real Estate 
Development Co. 
Only one project 
(Parcel 2) was 
carried out and 
completed in 1997.
D 8 7102.3 m² Applied for office and housing 
development in 1996 
Completed and was 
partially used for 
commercial use 
Assets were transferred to Guangzhou 
Traffic Artificer School for 15 








 9 12938 m² Land was transferred to 
LREMC in 2000 
LREMC resettled 
Factory D to Huadu 
(transfer process 
was not clear) 
E 10 6926 m² In 1993, Factory E redeveloped 
a land parcel of 1800 m² with 
SRF 
completed Together with Tianli Development 
Company, Factory E redevelop the 




process was not 
clear) 
F 11 N/A F changed the land use type and 
used its assets for Liwan 
Electric Equipment Market
 
Source: record of Planning Permission in GUPB (accessed in June, 2004) & author’s survey 
 
Figure 6.11 Redevelopment of SOE occupied Land 
Source: record of Planning Permission in GUPB (accessed in June, 2004), Urban 
Planning Bureau Liwan Branch, maps in Guangzhou Urban Planning & Design Survey 
Research Institute (accessed in June, 2004) and author’s survey 
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Redevelopment of SOE’s land was complicated as most factories tried several ways to 
redevelop. In practice, the SOEs chose the order of redevelopment: changing land use 
type first, finding a partner to redevelop land if in funding difficulties, and transferring 
land to new land users by negotiation if redevelopment project was not able to be 
carried out. 
 
1. Redevelopment by SOEs 
 
Shown in Table 6.10, within 11 land parcels, 8 parcels have been planned to change land 
use type and be redeveloped by SOEs themselves as the first attempt for redevelopment. 
Generally, part of the new buildings would be housing provided for staff or offices used 
by SOE itself, and other parts would be sold or rented out as shops. For example, 
Factory D built a complex for both residential and commercial use on land parcel 8. 
There were some shops provided on the first floor. There shops were rented to 
merchants. Factory E did the same on one parcel of its land. Factory A renovated one of 
its workshops and changed its use to Quanxin Business Centre, renting out space as 
offices to small companies (see Figure 6.12). Factory F did not even renovate their 












Figure 6.12 Photos of Some Redevelopment Projects 
Left: Liwan Electric Equipment Market                             Right: Quanxin Business Centre 
Source: photos taken by the author in August, 2004 
 
However, it was found that commercial and housing buildings provided by SOEs could 
not meet the requirement of the market and no investors would like to risk on such 
projects. Although Factory B attempted to use its workshops for commercial use, it 
failed in financing the project. Only two projects survive in the market competition. One 
is Liwan Electric Equipment Market which was established in the early 1990s as one of 
the pioneers of this service in Liwan District. The other one is Quanxin Business Centre 
which was well decorated (see Figure 6.12). Other housing or commercial building 
projects carried out by SOEs had all been redeveloped as join-venture projects or 
transferred to new land users. As long as these redevelopment projects were profitable, 




To provide buildings which could meet the requirement of the market, SOE need capital. 
If in funding difficulties, SOEs would seek and woo development capital to form a 
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partnership. Joint-venture between SOE land user and developers was found in the 
redevelopment of 9 land parcels of 5 factories. Most of the completed projects were 
commodity housing. Generally, the completed housing units were sold off and the 
revenue was split between the SOE and developer. 
 
Use of SOE’s land was supervised by the industrial group that the SOE belongs to. 
Inevitably, the group subordinated REDCs became the first one obtaining the 
opportunity to redevelop SOE’s land. For example, GWG Jinlun Real Estate 
Development Company was established in 1993 under the supervision of GWG to 
redevelop the occupied land by factories within GWG. In Jinhuajie, the occupied land of 
GWG factories was all firstly attempted by joint-venture between the factories and 
Jinlun. Only when the market is extraordinary flourishing in 1995, did the projects 
invested by Jinlun managed to complete (Parcel 1, 2 with Factory A). Other projects had 
all failed due to the financial problems (Parcel 4 with Factory A, Parcel 6 with Factory 
B, Parcel 7 with Factory C). 
 
When the group subordinated REDCs could not offer the capital that the redevelopment 
projects required, the SOEs would resort to private developers. Factory C redeveloped 
one land parcel with Anye Real Estate Development Co. – a private development 
company. And Factory E redeveloped its land to Huangshanghuang Mansion with Tianli 
Development Company. Partnership between the SOEs and private developers actually 
provided an opportunity for developers in the private sector to grow as it avoided the 
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large outlay of funds in the mode of land leasing (Zhu, 2004). One typical case is Tianli 
Development Company (TDC). It was a small company with 10 staff in 1995, but it had 
grown to a top real estate company with 550 million registered capital when it was 
reorganized to Fuli Estate Co. Ltd. in 2001. In the late 1990s, TDC had carried out 23 
projects (over 3000, 000 m² of construction area) to redevelop SOE occupied land 
(http://www.epvalley.com/ztbd/7.htm; http://finance.sina.com.cn/crz/20031018/105048 
0336.shtml, accessed on March 8, 2005). One of these projects is Huangshanghuang 
Mansion in Jinhuajie. 
 
3. Land transfer through negotiation 
 
Regulated by the municipality, at least 44% of the land leasing payment has to be 
handed over to the government when a SOE transfers the occupied land. Land transfer 
thus becomes the last choice for the SOEs to capitalize the value of their land user rights. 
However, not every SOE could find capital to redevelop its occupied land by 
themselves or joint-venture. During the first few years of the 21st century, SOEs 
relocated in the late 1990s were facing the threat of losing their land use rights. As the 
last straw, land transfer was adopted by SOEs to capture the land profits.
 
In practice, SOEs negotiate with the buyer for better compensation but not higher land 
leasing payment. For example, Factory D obtained RMB ￥ 15 million from 
transferring one land parcel and assets on it to Guangzhou Traffic Artificer School. As 
return, Guangzhou Traffic Artificer School could pay less land lease payment. Factory 
A transferred all its debts to Huaxiakanglong as the exchange of the use rights of Land 
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Parcel 3 and the buildings on it, and thus Huaxiakanglong paid less for the land transfer. 
Similarly, Factory B transferred the land parcel and assets to Linan Art Institute when 
redevelopment project failed. As the exchange, the SOEs would apply to the 
municipality for cutting down of land leasing payment. Generally, land leasing payment 
is charged as 80% as standard approval price in a SOE land redevelopment project. In 
some cases, a further 20% discount will be granted if the new use is evaluated as the 
‘optimal use’ (Zheng, 2001). 
 
6.3.4 Facility Improvement by the Municipality 
 
Public facilities were provided by different sectors in the government. Jinhuajie is an 
area with top secondary and high schools. Its predominance in education was 
strengthened during the urban redevelopment process of Jinhuajie. Shown in Table 6.11, 
due to the limited fund, only one case of enhancement of school was taken in the 1980s. 
When the local government gained more revenues from economic growth, enhancement 
of educational facilities and urban infrastructures accelerated since the early 1990s. 
 
Table 6.11 Development of Public Facilities by the Municipality 
No. Provider Use Type/ project Year
1 Ludixi Primary School education 1980
2 4th Middle School education 1991
3 Education Bureau of Liwan District* nursery school 1994
4 11th Middle School education 1995
5 Guangzhou Road Expansion Office* Kangwang Road 1996
6 Education Bureau of Liwan District 4th Middle School 2001
* The land for the construction of Kangwang Road and nursery school was provided by the REDCs in the 
comprehensive urban redevelopment project. 
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Figure 6.13 Public Facilities Projects in Jinhuajie (1978-present) 






This chapter summarizes the redevelopment process of Jinhuajie which answers one of 
the research questions – what patterns and processes of land redevelopment have been 
generated in transitional China? Different players have been involved in the 
redevelopment process and special characteristics of the redevelopment have been 
observed. 
 
1. rapid large scale urban redevelopment  
 
In the small area of Jinhuajie (44 ha), 92 projects have been carried out within 25 years. 
Jinhuajie has changed from a dilapidated residential area with concentrated light 
industries to an area of housing, commercial buildings, offices and new urban 
infrastructures. Old dilapidated neighborhoods were demolished to make way for new 
construction which aimed at produce a landscape of “world city” in southern China 
(Yeh & Wu, 1999). What has been produced includes not only modern commodity 
housings and offices but also 9-storey housing with basic facilities (refer to Figure 6.4). 
Also, the factories in Jinhuajie have been moved out and their land has been provided 
for commodity housing, office and shopping centre development.  
 
2. evolution of the redevelopment modes 
 
Corresponding to the property rights evolution in the transition, different redevelopment 
types were prevalent in different stages of the transitional era and provided different 
landscapes. Jinhuajie experienced three different redevelopment types: housing, 
workshops and offices developed by danwei for their own use, comprehensive urban 
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redevelopment project and development of SOE’s land. 
a. the 1980s: Housing, workshops and offices developed by danweis for their own 
use 
 
After decades of stagnation, urban redevelopment was first carried out by danweis in 
small quantity for the provision of housing and facilities for its own use following the 
traditional socialist tight relationship between danweis and urban development. Through 
scattered development of multiple-storied housing, workshops and offices, danweis first 
changed the landscape of dilapidated neighborhood during the 1980s. Comparing with 
clear acquisition of rural land in the urban periphery during this period, supply-side 
constraints hampered urban redevelopment of central areas in Chinese cities. In 
Jinhuajie, urban redevelopment was stagnated for 30 years. Even after the economic 
reform when much more investments could be spend on land redevelopment, only 17 
projects had been carried out over 10 years. 
 
b. the 1990s: comprehensive large scale urban redevelopment project 
 
When the urban reform started in 1988, the municipality obtained more autonomic 
power to arrange the urban development and redevelopment in Guangzhou and became 
a so-called developmental state which was hungry for the economic growth and urban 
development. It advocated urban redevelopment in order to enhance land value and to 
provide better environment for economic growth. Large scale redevelopment projects 
were carried out. 57 buildings were constructed in Jinhuajie in 10 years. In addition to 
the resettlement housing for residents, commodity housing and offices, the government 
subordinated REDCs also provided public facilities in Jinhuajie. As the exchange, the 
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developers obtain the land leasehold at no payment to the government and flexible 
planning control subject to negotiation over development.  
 
c. the late 1990s: development of SOE’s land 
 
In the early 1990s, the government carried out the SOE reform within industry groups to 
restructure assets and resources. Associated with the SOE reform, a large amount of 
factories were relocated to urban peripheral areas and their occupied land was released 
for redevelopment. SOE occupied land in Jinhuajie was redeveloped within 5 years. In 
practice, SOEs adopted the following order of redevelopment. First, the SOEs would 
change of land use or redevelop the land by themselves; then, joint-venture between 
SOEs and developers for commodity housing projects would be chosen if the first 
option was in finance problems. If both failed, SOEs would transfer the land by 
negotiation. 
 
3. flexible planning control 
 
Often, the planning procedures and operations are discretionarily explained and 
manipulated by the government in the transitional China (Xu, 2001). This phenomenon 
has also been observed in land redevelopment in Jinhuajie. A very flexible land use 
planning system subject to negotiation was observed. Some planning control parameters 
such as plot ratio and land use types have been changed upon the request of the 
government subordinated REDCs. In the late 1990s, frequent change of redevelopment 
plans had been offered by the local state to promote the redevelopment of SOE’s land.
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 7    INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FOR LAND




Special characteristics of land redevelopment in the study area are structured by the 
evolving institutions. This chapter discusses the institutional changes for land 
redevelopment via a property rights approach. Interactions among land users, 
developers and the state were always structured by the property rights of the actors 
(Webster & Lai, 2003). It is generally understood that those who played a pivotal role in 
the central plan system have a vested interest in maintaining their rights and are in a 
strong bargaining position to influence institutional changes towards the socialist market 
economy (Zhu, 2005). Institutional changes are thus gradual. Based on the study of land 
redevelopment processes in Jinhuajie, this chapter discusses the evolution of property 
rights over land in land redevelopment in the transitional China. 
 
7.2 Initial Property Rights Structure: Land Use Rights of Existing Land Users 
 
Redevelopment in Jinhuajie in the 1980s reveals the property rights setting before the 
urban reform. Under the socialist system of the planned economy, property rights over 
land were theoretically controlled by the state and excluded from economic transaction. 
Before the 1978 economic reform started in 1978, development of Chinese cities was 
carried out by danweis on the state allocated land. As for urban housing in the central 
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areas, residents were stratified into the tenure of private, workplace and municipal 
housing according to their socio-economic status (Logan et al., 1999). There were no 
land markets, and land users were not allowed to transact or transfer their land use 
rights. However, as what has been emphasized by Marcuse, “… in socialist systems, the 
right of use …even if referred to as ‘tenancy’, equaled or exceeded in many ways those 
conventionally associated with ‘ownership’” (1996: 135). Land use rights of existing 
land users set up the precondition for redevelopment since the urban reforms. In detail, 
property rights of residents and danweis have been summarized as following: 
 
1. Land user I: residents 
 
In Chinese cities, urban land is owned by the state. Even for the owner of private houses, 
they are tenants of state-owned land. In most urban redevelopment projects, residential 
relocation is passive for tenants as the processes of demolition and resettlement for 
redevelopment projects are regarded as the reassignment of state-owned land by the 
state. The passive relocation, i.e. the relocation not initiated by households, is caused by 
municipal infrastructure development, real estate development, danwei housing 
relocation, and government housing congestion alleviation programmes (Wu, 2004). 
However, passive relocations are not necessarily equivalent to involuntary ones, as the 
households are offered the rights to bargain for the compensation. Compensation is 
awarded according to a pre-set standard and there is a large scope for bargaining 
between the construction units and households. In Guangzhou, residents had to be 
on-site resettled for any project of redevelopment as the compensation for the 
136 
demolished housing from 1984 to the middle 1990s13. This was equivalent to the 
transfer of a tenant’s land use rights to the new sites at similar locations.  
 
In central areas of Chinese cities, there are also a large amount of households living in 
state-owned public housing (either provided by the municipal housing bureau or 
danweis). With the aim of seeking collaboration of residents and maintaining social 
stability, the government in practice recognizes tenancy rights. There is little difference 
between the housing owners and tenants in the compensation schemes as that has been 
revealed in the case study of Jinhuajie. According to Table 7.1, as lease relationship 
could not be cancelled, what the tenants could claim through the compensation was 
almost the same as the actual owners do, except for some payments for temporary 
shelters. Later, the new public housing units were sold to the tenants at a discounted 
price. Therefore, the demolition of housing was compensated with more than what 
would be derived from the tenancy in a market system during the land redevelopment 
process (Wu, 2004). 
 
Residents can bargain for compensation because their land use right has been strong 
under the socialist system (Marcuse, 1996). Due to the fiscal shortage and huge 
compensation to residents in land redevelopment, the government could hardly carry 
out any redevelopment projects. 
                                                        
13 In 1997, the Guangzhou municipality issued “Regulation of Urban Demolition and Resettlement in Guangzhou” 
(1997) in which the requirement of on-site resettlement for residents was discarded for the first time. Requirement of 
on-site resettlement was listed as Clause 36 in the “Guideline to Implementation of Urban Demolition and 
Resettlement in Guangzhou” (1992) and Clause 16 in “Measures of Land Acquisition and Urban Demolition and 
Resettlement in Guangzhou” (1984). 
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Table 7.1 Compensation to land and housing occupants in Urban Resettlement in the 
1980s 
land and housing occupants Compensation 
Private housing owners a. On-site resettlement housing based on the size and quality of 
the demolished structures 
b. No rent payment for temporary shelters. 
Public housing * tenants a. Lease relationships should be kept.   
b. Rent payment for the temporary shelters provided by the 
construction units would be charged at 70% of the regulated 
standard. 
Private housing tenants a. Lease relationships should be kept.  
b. Rent payment for the temporary shelters provided by the 
construction units would be charged at 70% of the regulated 
standard. 
* Public housing refers to the municipality managed housing and danwei managed housing 
Source: “Measures of Land Acquisition and Urban Demolition and Resettlement in 
Guangzhou” (1984) & author’s survey 
 
2. Land user II: danweis (including SOEs) 
Following the institutional system of the centrally-planned economy, land was allocated 
by plans set by the central government. The central planning system allocated urban 
land to danweis through administrative channels which did not impose a rental 
arrangement on them (Zhu, 2002). Being the units through which the state organized 
production and distribute social welfare, danweis in practice controlled state assets 
assigned for utilization (Li, 1993). It is very hard for the state as the land owner to 
retrieve land once land was assigned to danweis. Proof has been observed in the case of 
Jinhuajie. Guangzhou Normal College (GNC) failed in acquiring the land used by the 
1st Manufactory although GNC had already obtained the permission from the 
government for reallocating the land. This is due to the right of danwei to refuse 
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handing in the land it occupied. This case also reveals that unlike the land used by 
residents, land occupied by danweis could not be reallocated by simply compensation 
for land use.  
 
Due to the land use rights of existing land users, the land redevelopment was hampered. 
In Jinhuajie, urban redevelopment was stagnated for 30 years. Even after the economic 
reform when much more investment could be made on urban land redevelopment, only 
17 projects were carried out from 1980 to 1988. However, the decentralization of the 
economic decision-making process resulted in the local government taking up 
responsibility for the urban development projects. This in turn instigated the local 
government into taking a greater interest of, and advocating development as a way of 
pursuing economic growth. The local government took some measures to initiate 
institutional changes to promote land redevelopment in central cities. Due to the 
different land use rights of residents and danweis, the institutional changes became 
gradual. 
 
7.3 Property Rights under the Coalition between the Local Government and 
Developers 
7.3.1 Coalition between the local government and developers 
 
Decentralization of decision-making offers the local state autonomy to act for its own 
interest and the government finally altered its path to the pursuit of economic growth. 
The urban reform gave the government the discretionary power to manage land uses. 
The governments at various levels are much more development-oriented and committed 
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to growth than before (Zhu, 1999). The socialist political state is thus changing to a 
socialist developmental state (Oi, 1996; Zhu, 1999). The emerging local developmental 
state advocated urban development and redevelopment to promote economic growth 
and to generate monetary returns. In the same vein, the municipality of Guangzhou 
became a strong advocate for growth with a deep interest in seeing more buildings 
constructed to change the built environment of central areas. Comprehensive large scale 
urban redevelopment to transform the urban built environment was listed on the local 
state’s agenda.  
 
Nevertheless, the local government’s tight budget was grossly inadequate for the 
ambitious urban redevelopment. To speed up urban redevelopment under the existing 
structure of property rights, the local developmental state initiated coalition with the 
developers. REDCs were established to redevelop the area partially for commercial 
interests and partially for social goods (improving residents’ housing conditions).  
 
Jinhuajie redevelopment is a typical case of coalition between the local government and 
REDCs. Three developers who sign the agreement to carry out the redevelopment 
projects of Jinhuajie are all subordinate REDCs. Their operations were thus under the 
supervision of different levels of government. LUCDC is a branch of Guangzhou Urban 
Construction Development Company (GUCDC), which was the result of reorganization 
of the Guangzhou Housing Development Office 14  in 1983. GUCDC is the first 
                                                        
14 This department was established in the municipality in 1978. 
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comprehensive real estate development enterprise of Guangzhou (http://www.homecity 
365.com/ aboutus/ intro/ index.html, accessed on Feb. 4, 2005). Both XDC and LREMC 
were established in 1985 by Liwan District government. This can be proved by the fact 
that the general managers of LREMC and LUCDC are both once officials in the local 
government –Mr. Shao (LREMC) came from the Headquarter for Urban Renewal of 
Jinhuajie, and Mr. Cao (LUCDC) came from the Urban Planning Bureau of Liwan 
District. To strengthen the coalition, Headquarter for Urban Renewal of Jinhuajie was 
established under the direct guide of the local government of Liwan District and a plan 
for the redevelopment was produced as the guidance. 
 
The municipal government adopted coalition with REDCs not only to promote land 
redevelopment but also to cut down the land revenue which should be handed over to 
the central government. Due to the distribution system of land revenues between the 
central, provincial and municipal governments, the local government was unwilling to 
use the mode of land leasing in the open market, for at least 15% of revenues from land 
leasing has to be handed over to the higher level governments. It is understood that the 
local municipal government would rather lease the land by negotiation through which 
the land leasing payment by the developer was lower than it would be through land 
leasing in the open market, but the developer is obligated to offer something else such 
as providing public facilities to the locality. Under the umbrella of coalitions, the local 
government and their subordinate REDCs co-operate in a fashion of reciprocity. On the 
one hand, the REDCs obtained the land at lower prices and are able to seek government 
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assistance like flexible planning controls. On the other hand, the REDCs should provide 
resettlement housing and some public facilities. 
 
7.3.2 Property rights of actors under the coalition 
1. Residents: compensation for handing over land use rights 
 
The local government devised a set of targets that had to be met: (1) to achieve 
collaboration with its residents, (2) to maintain social stability; and (3) to attract 
investment. In practice, the set of targets ensured that residents would be highly 
compensated for their land use rights. Although it was compulsory for the residents to 
make way for the new construction, they could bargain for the compensation. In 
Guangzhou, Two compensation measures were regulated by the “Guideline to 
Implementation of Urban Demolition and Resettlement in Guangzhou” (1992) and it 
was up to the housing owners to choose the way of compensation: 
1. on-site resettlement housing offered with the same size of the demolished one15 
2. cash compensation for the demolished structure based on the evaluation by the 
Guangzhou Real Estate Exchange 
Obviously, the residents would chose the on-site resettlement, as only the remaining 
value of demolished structures would be compensated in cash and this amount could not 
buy a new housing unit in similar locations. Public housing tenants were on-site 
resettled, as lease relationship could not be cancelled and the developers had to provide 
a place at a similar location for the tenants to live.  
                                                        
15 The regulation about the compensation was actually more complicated. For instance, when the living area per 
capita was less than 5 m²for one household, the minimum compensation would be 5 m² per capita. 
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 Specifically in Guangzhou, the Overseas Chinese owned housing units had to be 
replaced twice in any redevelopment projects. Overseas Chinese owned housing was 
allocated to tenants during the 1950s and 1960s. Since 1987, returning Overseas 
Chinese their owned housing units has been a policy of Guangdong Province to reassure 
the Overseas Chinese that the province is a safe haven for investment (World Bank, 
1993). On the other hand, housing tenants could not be expelled. Two-fold replacement 
for the Overseas Chinese owned housing units was thus required – once to provide new 
housing managed by the municipality to the tenant and once to provide the Overseas 
Chinese to a replacement for their demolished unit. In Jinhuajie, about 100 house units 
have been replaced twice (interview to manager in LUCDC on Apr. 7, 2005). 
 
Besides on-site resettlement, all returning households in Jinhuajie redevelopment 
project have also received extra payment for moving expenses, temporary shelters, 
temporary shutout, etc (refer to Table 6.4). They are also paid for the delay of 
redevelopment projects. As a result, the demolition of housing was compensated with 
more than what would be in a mature market system. All the residents were resettled 
on-site, which allowed them to enjoy same or enlarged housing size16, improved 
housing condition and environment. 
 
2. land user II: danweis 
 
                                                        
16 The compensation for on-site resettlement had been set that if the original living area is less than 5 
m² per person, compensation of 5 m² per person will be provided free-of-charge. For households 
whose living area is less than 5 m² per person, the house units were enlarged. For other households, 
same area of the demolished units would be provided.
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Under the socialist system of the planned economy, the land use rights of SOEs 
‘equaled or exceeded in many ways those conventionally associated with “ownership”’ 
(Marcuse, 1996: 135). SOEs have strong land use rights which offer them the ability 
holding onto their land plots firmly and developing their occupied land as the basic 
units of the socialist state economy. During the first upsurge of urban redevelopment in 
the early 1990s, SOE’s land was not included as the SOEs were not passive to make 
way for new development and the compensation for demolished premises only is not 
considered an incentive strong enough to give up the land use rights (Zhu, 2004). 
 
3. Government subordinated REDCs 
 
As the local government was unable to meet the two objectives of reducing land 
revenues owned to the central government and providing compensation to residents, it 
became necessary for the government to seek external help, via the coalitions with 
REDCs.  As a result of the close relationship with the local state, these state 
subordinated REDCs are of note-worthy interest.  
 
Obtaining land leasehold 
Coalition brought a special way for the REDCs to obtain the land leasehold. Developers 
must pay for the land leasehold to the government under the new land leasehold system. 
However, the REDCs did not pay for the acquisition of land leasehold. Payments for 
land leasing were charged in an in-kind way – providing housing compensation to the 
residents and building public facilities for the local community as well as the 
municipality, both of which were actually responsibilities of the local government. 
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Development of public facilities accounted for a significant cost to the REDCs and 
those facilities were finally transferred free of charge to the local government as what 
has been observed in the case of redevelopment projects of Jinhuajie (refer to Table 6.5; 
Figure 6.10). 
 
Control over development rights 
Being a system of regulating mechanisms, land use planning is an essential factor to 
stabilize the land and property market through increased certainty with respect to the 
future character of a place and reduce or internalize the impact of negative externalities 
(Jud, 1980; Zhu, 2004). However, as the exchange of the local benefit that the REDCs 
offer to the local government, planning control over their development rights was 
flexible. When the REDCs resorted to the local state for higher plot ratio to achieve the 
financial balance of the urban redevelopment project and increase commercial 
profitability, the local state changed the planning control parameters to accommodate 
them (see Table 6.7). Increased densities create unfavorable externalities in the locality 
as well as to the neighboring sites.  
 
4. developer II: foreign or private developers 
 
Unlike state subordinated REDCs, foreign or private developers acted as free actors in 
the development market. They were free to enter and disengage from the redevelopment 
projects. For instance, Hong Kong Jifen Investment Company stopped its investment on 
the redevelopment of Parcel 117 of Jinhuajie redevelopment projects in 1996 due to the 
                                                        
17 The joint-venture was formed between Jifeng Investment Company and LREMC in 1992. 
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poor market situation. However, property rights of foreign developers are not always 
clear. During the redevelopment process, foreign and private developers were first 
involved through the way of joint-venture in the early 1990s as the local REDCs would 
not give up the lucrative development projects of commodity housing and offices. 
Under the coalition between the local state and its subordinated REDCs, the foreign and 
private developers could also enjoy the flexible planning control and had to share the 
revenues with the local REDCs after the joint-venture project was completed and sold 
off  – which means, the development rights over land of foreign and private developers 
were not clear, either. 
 
Transfer of leasehold of land parcels with pre-set planning control parameters had been 
adopted by REDCs since 1996 as the REDCs were eager to obtain the capital for on-site 
resettlement housing development so as to reduce the amount of delay charge. They 
paid for the land leasehold to the REDCs and carried out the construction all by 
themselves. For example, LUCDC gained more than ￥0.2 billion from Yingfa (HK) 
for the development of the project of Ximenkou Square in Jinhuajie (source: interview 
to the official in LUCDC on Apr. 7, 2005). 
 
7.3.3 Implications of the coalitions 
Property rights resetting 
As in the case of the redevelopment project of Jinhuajie, the coalition speeded up urban 
redevelopment by compensating the residents and providing on-site facilities and 
off-site infrastructures as the replacement of the land leasing payment. More importantly, 
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by resettling residents and housing commoditization, socialist land use rights of 
residents and tenancy right over public housing were replaced by ownership of private 
housing in the market. Sequential urban redevelopment could thus be carried out 
according to the new market mechanisms. 
 
While the comprehensive urban redevelopment plan adopted by the coalition did have 
the effect of pushing the urban redevelopment process in the central areas, it did not 
attain a total success rate. As stipulated by the existing land users’ strong use rights, the 
residents had to be on-site resettled, and this situation hampered the achievement of the 
target of restructuring urban land uses. In the meantime, land revenues which should 
been distributed among the de jure land owners - the central, provincial, municipal 
governments – are retained in Jinhuajie in the forms of housing compensated to the 
residents and public facilities. 
 
Problems and consequence 
During the first few years of practice of the coalition, various problems manifested. Due 
to the coalition, a very flexible land use planning system subject to negotiation was 
observed. In order to push for redevelopment, negotiations between developers and 
governments often led to alteration of planning parameters in the interests of individual 
projects (Zhu, 2004a). Individual projects may thus become financially feasible, but 




Furthermore, although the residents were compensated for delay in the redevelopment 
projects, the risks that the projects could not be completed were still present. Due to the 
developers’ limited ability to finance the redevelopment projects, the resettlement of the 
residents was always delayed. The residents would continuously appeal to the 
government to solve the problems. Environmental and social problems pushed the local 
government to abandon the coalition with the local developers. New institution of 
commodification of socialist land use rights was introduced in new land redevelopment 
projects. A report reveals that 3.42 million m² of construction area had been demolished 
in central areas since 1997 and 60,000 households were involved within which 28,000 
households were not resettled yet (http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/dflf/ 
2003-02/12/1934195047.html, accessed on 16 June, 2005).
 
In facing with the problems, the local government was not willing to share the risks 
with the REDCs any more. The government would no longer relax development control 
to promote redevelopment projects but began to ask the residents to resort to juristic 
methods to claim for loss in uncompleted redevelopment projects (Southern Metropolis 
Daily, 26 May, 2005). On the other hand, for the new initiated land redevelopment 
projects, the government requested the developers to pay the residents in cash for the 
demolished structure at the price of 120% of the market price of the old units at one 
stroke, no matter whether the residents required cash compensation or resettlement. For 
the situation of resettlement, the residents would have the priority to buy new buildings 
(“Management Measure of Urban Housing Demolishment in Guangzhou”, 2004). 
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 7.4 Commodification of Short-term de facto Ownership of SOEs over Their 
Occupied Land 
 
In Chinese cities, land redevelopment was promoted by the value of new land uses 
which was introduced to Chinese cities by the urban reforms. However, while old 
dilapidated neighborhoods were redeveloped under the coalition between the local state 
and developers, a large amount of administratively allocated land was still held by 
SOEs. Following the institutions of the centrally-planned system, once SOEs had been 
allocated land for their uses and occupation, it was up to the SOEs to decide how to use 
the asset and became very difficult in practice for the state to intervene (Zhu, 2004). 
Strong land use rights of SOEs endowed SOEs with the ability to hold tight to their 
occupied land, and compensation for demolished premises only is not considered an 
incentive strong enough to give up the land use rights. Driven by a formidable market 
demand for premises in the central locations, institutional change was called for to 
remove supply-side constraints by offering incentives to actors participating in land 
redevelopment (Zhu, 2004).  
 
7.4.1 Property Rights of Actors in the redevelopment of SOE land 
 
1. Land user: SOEs 
Short-term de facto ownership of SOE over occupied land 
A new measure was taken by the local government to promote the redevelopment of 
SOE land. SOEs were allowed to keep their land as administratively allocated land for 5 
more years without paying for land leasing or rent18. Based on “Notice on reduce of 
                                                        
18 Referring to “Temporary regulation on management of administratively allocated land during SOE reforms” 
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land leasing payment of state-owned enterprises” (1995), SOEs under reform are 
allowed to change the land use type, develop19 or transfer the administratively allocated 
land under the supervision of their industrial groups. Only in the case of land transfer, 
would the land leasing payment be required. Even so, most of the land transfer revenue 
would be kept by the SOE except those handed over to the central and provincial 
governments, for Guangzhou subway construction and administration fee (accounting 
for 44% of the total revenue). In most cases, the government even supports the 
redevelopment SOE’s land by reducing the amount of land leasing revenues transferred 
to the government (Zheng, 2002). Thus, a SOE could have the de facto ownership – 
which includes the rights to use, to develop and to transfer the land over their occupied 
land for 5 years since its relocation.  
 
Based on the regulation of SOE reforms in Guangzhou and the restriction of 5-year’s 
grace holding de facto land ownership, SOEs could only obtain full land revenues by 
redeveloping it in the terms given by the regulations. Once land plots were redeveloped, 
developed buildings with titles were tradable at market prices and thus land revenues 
could be materialized (Zhu, 2004). Redevelopment of SOE occupied land was quickly 
carried out in Guangzhou even though the real estate market did not provide 
encouraging prices for newly developed projects (see Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3 Increase of the Price of Commodity Housing (Yuan/sqm) 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
4294.1 4262.3 price 3738.6 3156.5 5106.1 5064.0 4842.3 4303.6 4200.0 4210.7
Source: Guangzhou Statistic Bureau, various years 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(1998). 
19 It was forbidden to develop the land parcel by SOE itself. Only joint-venture was allowed. 
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 Although transparent land leasing is supposedly the best way to maximize revenues 
from land sales in the interests of owners, it has not been used often (Zhu, 2004). 
Inevitably, land transfer was the last choice for the SOE sellers, as not all the land 
revenues could be retained by the sellers. Seeking as much land revenue as possible, 
SOEs adopted the following order of redevelopment in practice. First, the SOEs would 
change land use and redevelop the land by themselves; then, joint-venture with a 
developer for developing commodity housing. If both failed, SOEs would transfer the 
land to a buyer. As the last resort, SOE sellers have to submit a certain amount of land 
leasing revenues to the government. SOEs could capture different amounts of land 
revenues through different redevelopment methods. However, it was up to the market to 
decide whether the redevelopment projects could be carried out and became profitable. 
Only those projects which meet the requirement of the market could survive in the 
market competition. 
 
Control over land redevelopment 
Nominally, the social welfare problem of the SOEs was the responsibility of the 
government. The local government had an incentive to promote the redevelopment SOE 
land to help loss-making SOEs, and in the meantime, upgrade the built environment. 
Through redevelopment of the occupied land, a SOE could obtain capital needed to 
rearrange its production and resettle its workers, which were actually the responsibilities 
of its owner – the government. In most parcels in Jinhuajie, SOEs tried different ways to 




In the meantime, the local government tried to push the relocation of SOEs and 
redevelopment of their occupied land by environment protection. In 1995, the bulletin 
of “Reply to the approval of the relocation of Quanxin Knitting Factory for 
environmental protection” was issued by Guangzhou Environment Protect Bureau to 
suggest one factory in Jinhuajie to relocate. In 1997, the local government of 
Guangzhou issued “Environmental Protection Plan of Guangzhou” which requires 68 
factories that produced heavy pollution to move out of the urban areas. In Jinhuajie, 4 
factories were in the list. As the imposement of an environment protection fee 
substantially increased the cost of production in factories located in the central areas, 
many industries were objectively stimulated to relocate. 
 
2. Industrial group subordinated REDCs 
In the redevelopment process of SOE’s land, industrial group subordinated REDCs 
obtained the priority to develop the land occupied by factories in the same group, 
because use of one SOE’s land was supervised by the industrial group that the SOE 
belongs to. However, no government aid would be offered to industrial group 
subordinated REDCs. Many projects carried out by REDCs have failed as the real estate 
markets is more and more competitive, and it becomes harder for real estate 
development companies supervised by industrial groups which lack of professional 
management to succeed. 
 
3. Private developers 
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When the group subordinated REDCs could not offer the capital that the redevelopment 
projects required, the SOEs would resort to private developers, such as Anye Real 
Estate Development Company and Tianli Development Company in the redevelopment 
of SOE land in Jinhuajie. These private developers are represented as free agents in the 
land market with the ability to negotiate for various deals with the SOEs. During the 
land transfer process, these private developers stand to gain the most since the land 
leasing payment was already largely reduced through government support in promoting 
redevelopment of SOE land. In this way, the land rent derived from underpriced land 
acquisition, which should otherwise go to the government, become transferred to the 
developers and SOEs. With the development of SOE occupied land, private developers 
seized the opportunity to grow as it avoided the large outlay of funds in the mode of 
land leasing (Zhu, 2004).  
 
7.4.2 Implications of commodification of SOE short-term de facto ownership 
 
Within several years, SOE occupied land in central Guangzhou has been redeveloped 
and SOE’s socialist land use rights are phased out. By redevelopment, land uses of 
central areas have been restructured and ownerships over properties have replace SOE 
land use rights. The redevelopment SOE occupied land in the late 1990s also witnessed 
the development of the land market. However, due to the restriction on redevelopment 
period and the flexible planning control, the redevelopment of SOE occupied land has 
been carried out in a rush and haphazard without careful planning. 
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7.5 Current Institution for Land Redevelopment 
With both residents and SOE’s land use rights being compensated, old land property 
rights system were replaced by a new one. On 31 August, 2004, the new regulation of 
“Notice on Strengthening the Supervision on Land Leasing of Profitable Projects via 
Bidding, Tender and Listing” was issued by the State. The Regulation required land to 
be leased through tender and bidding for all “profitable projects”, which include the 
offices, commercial buildings and commodity housings. Negotiation is strictly 
forbidden for such projects.  
 
Land redevelopment in Chinese cities has long been the process of replacing the 
dilapidated neighborhoods and firms to offices, commercial buildings and commodity 
housings. Forbidden of negotiation for land leasing of such projects suddenly brought 
the land redevelopment into a new stage. All the actors have to play in the land 
redevelopment market according to the market rules. In another word, the transitional 
institutions, such as coalition, short-term de facto ownership of the SOEs, are now 
phasing out the land redevelopment market.  
 
7.6 Summary: Path-dependent Evolution of Property Rights 
Referring to Figure 7.1, the institutional changes of property rights evolution and the 
consequences have been revealed in this chapter. China’s economic reform since 1978 
has triggered decision decentralization and market transition, which generate dynamic 
forces and shape the patterns and processes of China’s urban redevelopment. Economic 
development and urban restructuring have become the premier tasks of Chinese cities 
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(He & Wu, 2005). Ever since 1988 when transfer of land use rights has became legal, 
Chinese cities are quickly transformed into a growth machine to promote local 
economic expansion and wealth accumulation (Zhu, 2000; Zhang, 2002; Fu, 2002). The 
local developmental state advocated land redevelopment to improve urban images and 
to promote local economic growth. 
 
Briefly, the institutional changes could be channeled to four phases. Initially, the sitting 
land users had strong land use rights which hampered the urban redevelopment as they 
could hold onto their land firmly.  
 
To promote land redevelopment, the local developmental state initiated coalition with 
state subordinated REDCs to carry out redevelopment of neighborhoods. In the 
redevelopment projects, the existing private land users have to hand over land for 
redevelopment but they would be compensated for the loss of land use rights. 
Developers obtained the right to develop with no land leasing fee and with flexible 
planning control, but at the cost of resettlement and compensation to the residents and 
provision of public facilities. By the government initiated redevelopment projects, 
residents land use rights were compensated and phased out in the emerging land market. 
Land revenues which were supposed to be handed over to central and provincial 
governments were siphoned off and used for construction of local public facilities. 
However, coalition for redevelopment of dilapidated neighborhoods could not touch the 




At the same time, SOE reforms in the early 1990s released SOE land to the market. In 
practice, SOEs were allowed to redevelop occupied land without payment for land 
leasing within 5 years in Guangzhou. The SOEs now have to relocate and hand over the 
right to use. And for a short period, it is allowed to develop their sitting land and gain 
profit or transfer the land but part of the profit must been handed over to the 
government. In another word, SOEs were pushed to redevelop occupied land in the 
terms regulated by the government to capture the land revenues. Although 
redevelopment of SOE land did not achieved satisfactory land uses, it helped to phase 
out SOE land use rights.  
 
With both residents and SOE’s land use rights being compensated, old land property 
rights system were replaced by a new one. New regulations to outlaw land leasing by 
negotiation have contributed substantially to the formation of the socialist land market 
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1. land lease through negotiation 
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Property rights evolution existing land users’ strong land use rights Property rights over state-owned land 
are ambiguously defined under the 
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ownership and the socialist land use 
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Property rights over land for real 
estate development is clearer defined 
Physical result  little redevelopment in central areas rapid large scale urban redevelopment 
with negative externality  
New upsurge of urban redevelopment 
notwithstanding the discouraging real 
estate market 
 
Institutional result Coalition between the local government 
and developers to promote the 
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Resident’s socialist land use rights phase 
out 
 
SOE’s socialist land use rights phase 
out 
1. Coalition phased out 
institutional change
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8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
Land redevelopment in both the planned economies and market economies have been 
well studied based on the neo-classical economic analysis and sociological analysis. 
Even in the mature Western countries, the land market is a less efficient one than many 
others (Evans, 1995). It has been observed that the “visible hand” of government 
intervention always mediates in the land market. It has also been revealed that in the 
transitional era from the centrally-planned system to the market economy, the state 
works undeniably and omnipresently in the transitional China (Lin, 1999; Logan, 
2002c; Zhu, 1999; Oi, 1996). 
 
In the transitional economy of China, ongoing housing commercialization, urban 
reform and industry restructuring, and prosperous real estate development are turning 
the urban central areas into a hotspot of urban redevelopment (He & Wu, 2005). In the 
meantime, economic decentralization has resulted in the decreasing capacity of the 
central state and the emergence of local developmental interests (Lin, 1999; Logan, 
2002). The local governments advocate redeveloping dilapidated central areas to 
improve living conditions and create a competitive city (Zhu, 1999c, 2000, 2002; Wu, 
2004). However, emphasizing on the role of the local state and coalition neglects the 
actions and rights of existing land users. Also, the existing literatures haven’t covered 
the evolution of the features and driving forces of the urban redevelopment, which is 
actually persisting during the transitional phase. The pattern and transition of urban 
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redevelopment in transitional China is thus still unclear. 
 
This research aims at assessing the driving force and evolution of land redevelopment 
in the transitional China. In the context of property rights and institutional change, 
objectives of this study have been set as:  
1. Why have there been institutional changes in the transitional China? 
2. How do the institutions evolve and structure the land redevelopment in the 
transitional China?  
3. Following the institutional change, what patterns and processes of land 
redevelopment have been generated in transitional China? 
 
8.2 Summary of Main Findings  
 
1. discrepancy between the redevelopment interests of local govement and the 
interests of existing land users 
The institutional context of urban development in transitional Guangzhou highlighted 
the power restructuring among different levels of governments and the emergence of 
incentives for local development. After 30 years control of the centrally planned 
system and industrial development, the impetus of urban development in the 
post-reform era could be boiled down to the economic, housing, urban and SOE 
reforms. The local government of Guangzhou has been empowered by the 
decentralization of economic decision-making since 1978. Restructuring of economic 
activities and introducing of paid land transfer system arouse local interests of land 
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redevelopment for economic growth. The local developmental state has thus gradually 
evolved. 
 
Due to political constraints, gradualism prevails and leads to trail and error in the 
implementation of new initiatives (Wang, 1994; Zhu, 2005). The old institutions have a 
vested interest in maintaining the status quo and are in a strong bargaining position to 
institutional changes. Land users, who have been endowed with strong land use rights, 
are keen to maximize their profit during the redevelopment process. Due to the 
disparity between the interests of the local developmental state and the existing land 
users, gradual institutional changes for land redevelopment in transitional China have 
been generated.  
 
Urban physical transition in Guangzhou has been shaped by institutions evolved in the 
transition. During the 1980s, urban expansion of Guangzhou was greatly interfered by 
the government plan. Real estate markets have begun to act as a strong booster in 
remaking Guangzhou’s landscape since the urban reform in 1988. The dynamics of 
development and redevelopment in Guangzhou have experienced several waves, 
indicating the evolution of the institutions. 
 
2. Institutional changes: evolution of property rights over land 
 
Gradual institutional changes emerged and evolved as the link between the out-going 
planning system and the in-coming market mechanisms. Initially, the sitting land users 
had strong land use rights which hampered the land redevelopment. To promote land 
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redevelopment, the local developmental state initiated coalition with state subordinated 
REDCs to carry out redevelopment of neighborhoods. Residents land use rights were 
compensated and phased out in the emerging land market. Land leasing payments 
which were supposed to be paid by the developers and partially handed over to central 
and provincial government were replaced by local public facilities. State subordinated 
REDCs tend to have problems in raising development finance in time and in sufficient 
amounts. They were engaged in intensive negotiations with government authorities for 
favorable terms. Flexible planning control over developers’ development rights was 
offered by the local government under the coalition. Coalition for redevelopment of 
dilapidated neighborhoods did not cover SOE occupied land whose redevelopment was 
hampered by SOE’s land use rights. 
 
In the late 1990s, SOEs were allowed to redevelop occupied land without land leasing 
payment or rent within 5 years in Guangzhou. Government aided the redevelopment of 
SOE occupied land by approvals for constantly change of land use and redevelopment 
types. Although redevelopment of SOE land did not achieved optimal land use, it 
helped to phase out SOE land use rights in the land market. With both residents and 
SOE’s land use rights compensated, property rights over land became clear in the land 
market. Coalition and short-term de facto ownership of SOE land were thus slowly 
phasing out the land market. New regulations to forbid negotiation for land leasing 
made land use in Chinese cities step further into the socialist land market mechanisms. 
 
3. Physical characteristics of land redevelopment 
161 
a. Rapid redevelopment 
The Jinhuajie case demonstrated that land redevelopment in the transition was 
structured by the in-coming market mechanisms, the emerging local developmental 
state and evolving transitional institutions. Advocated by the local developmental state, 
land redevelopment in central areas has been carried out rapidly. The study area has 
quickly changed from a dilapidated residential area with concentrated light industries 
to an area of housing, commercial buildings, offices and new urban infrastructures.  
b. Evolution of redevelopment types 
Corresponding to the property rights evolution in the transition, different 
redevelopment types have been popular in different stages of the transitional era and 
provided different landscapes. In the 1980s, the existing land users hold tight to their 
land and there were only scattered housing and office development projects carried out 
by danweis. Since 1988, the local developmental state initiated coalition with the 
developers to carry out large scale redevelopment projects so as to speed up urban 
redevelopment under the existing structure of property rights. In addition to the 
resettlement housing for residents, commodity housing and offices, the government 
subordinated REDCs also provided public facilities. As the exchange, the developers 
obtain the land leasehold at no payment to the government and flexible planning 
control subject to negotiation over development. In the early 1990s, associating with 
the commoditization of SOE’s short-term de facto ownership, SOE occupied land were 
redeveloped within 5 years in the study area. SOE were free to adopt different method 
of redevelopment to pursue the land revenue. 
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c. Flexible planning control 
Due to the coalition between the local state and developers, a very flexible land use 
planning system subject to negotiation was observed. Some planning control 
parameters such as plot ratio and land use types have been changed upon the request of 
the government subordinated REDCs. In the late 1990s, frequent change of 
redevelopment plans and reduced penalty of illegal construction had been offered by 




By this research, we can conclude: during the transition, the local government initiated 
gradual institutional changes to speed up local land redevelopment and phase out 
existing strong land use rights step by step. Informal property rights push 
redevelopment activities but do not provide certainty to the market and incentives for 
the optimal utilization of resources. 
 
Building effective institutions for markets is a great challenge to many developing 
countries and transitional economies (Zhu, 2005). China’s experience in establishing 
urban land markets has characterized by trial and error, structured by the gradual 
institutional changes. Land redevelopment in Guangzhou demonstrates that the local 
state plays a very important role in managing land redevelopment to pursue local 
benefits. The continuous decentralization since the reforms has created the local 
developmental state which advocates land redevelopment as a mean of local growth. 
However, the ambition of local government for land redevelopment confronted with the 
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strong rights of existing land users who hold firmly to their land unless satisfying price 
was paid. At the early stage of transition, the local government could not afford for the 
high compensation to existing land users to carry out land redevelopment. 
 
During the transition, the local government initiated gradual institutional changes to 
speed up local land redevelopment. Under the local growth coalition between the 
government and developers, property rights of state subordinated REDCs are 
characterized by in-kind land leasing payment with flexible planning control on the 
basis of bargaining. During this process, residents’ land use rights were compensated 
and phased out in the emerging land market. Later, de facto ownership is offered to 
SOEs in a short period to use, develop and transfer their occupied land to speed up 
redevelopment of SOE occupied land. Transitional institutional changes help to dispel 
socialist land use rights of residents and SOEs and make further development to be 
able to follow market mechanisms. As the proof, when socialist land use rights are 
phased out of the land market, the government abandons coalition and takes further 
measures for SOE reforms. For urban land, new regulations to forbid negotiation for 
land leasing made land use in Chinese cities step further into the socialist land market 
mechanisms. However, informal property rights over land during the transitional 
redevelopment process create land rents. Pursuing land rents results in rapid but 
sub-optimal redevelopment and inadequate order in the land market. Informal property 
rights push redevelopment activities but do not provide certainty to the market and 
incentives for the optimal utilization of resources. 
164 
 Inevitably, city governments would have to pay for rapid land redevelopment as the 
redevelopment results harm urban planning and development control. Due to the delay 
of the preparation of new land use plans and fast redevelopment, most land parcels 
were transferred or redeveloped through negotiation before the land use plan was 
drawn up in Guangzhou. In other words, the use of the land parcels was pre-defined 
before an overall development control was prepared. This brought difficulties in 
planning preparation as the planners either had to revise their original intentions to 
include the pre-defined uses or had to negotiate with developers to reach a compromise 
(Xu, 2001). 
 
8.4 Contribution to the Existing Knowledge 
 
This research contributes to the analysis of urban redevelopment in transitional 
economy in general and the understanding of urban redevelopment of the transitional 
China in particular. 
 
First, this dissertation has developed a theoretical framework to discover the pattern of 
institutional changes for land redevelopment. The structure of property rights over land 
and the evolution of property rights are studied by looking into the roles of different 
actors in the land redevelopment process. This framework can apply not only to 
China’s urban studies, but also to other transitional contexts.  
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Second, this dissertation tracks the changes of institutions for land redevelopment in 
the transitional China. Existing sociological analyses of urban redevelopment tend to 
provide separated institutional background for the redevelopment rather than a 
sequential evolution of the institutions and actor’s behaviors during the institutional 
change which this research focuses (Logan and Molotch, 1984; Logan and Molotch, 
1987; Molotch, 1993; Stone, 1989; Stone, 1993; Lauria, 1997; Elkin, 1987; Fainstein 
and Fainstein, 1983; Kirby, 1993; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Zhu, 1999a and 
Dowding, 2001). 
 
Third, it has provided a systematic analysis of the impact of institutional changes on 
land redevelopment in China’s transitional economy. Existing research failed in giving 
a detailed and systematic treatment to the roles of and interactions among the various 
actors (Han, 2000; Zhu, 1999c, 2004b). This research, by scrutinizing the property 
rights structures over land and the resulted redevelopment patterns, offers an insight to 
the land redevelopment in the transitional China. 
 
 
8.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
Tracking the institutional change in transitional economy 
A trend of clarifying the property rights of the actors in the transitional economy has 
been revealed in this research. New regulations of the forbiddance of land transfer 
through negotiation in 2004 indicated a new stage of institutional change. Also, the 
local government is currently taking measures to abandon the coalition. For instance, 
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due to the coalition between the local state and developers, the local government would 
help the developers to complete the redevelopment projects by relaxing planning 
control. However, it is now recommending the residents to sue the developers for 
proper compensation without delay (Southern Metropolis Daily, May 26, 2005) and 
would no longer offer any help to the developers. A clearer definition of the property 
rights is emerging. 
 
Tracking the property rights of actors in the urban development and redevelopment 
would finally build up a theoretical framework of institutional change in the 
transitional economy which this research is unable to achieve constrained by current 
stage of transition. 
 
An empirical research integrating property rights approach and urban development in 
transitional economy 
Property rights analysis in the urban redevelopment could also offer an insight to the 
patterns and changes of urban development. As what has been introduced in the 
theoretical framework, it is through property rights over land that the state intervenes 
in the building provision in the emerging land market. Property rights approach could 
be applied to study the urban development and its evolution. 
 
Comparative studies between Chinese cities and other cities in transitional economies 
A significant characteristic of the research is that its theoretical framework can be 
replicated to other Chinese cities as well as cities in other transitional economies. In 
the comparative study, it will likewise be possible to investigate the urban development 
and redevelopment structured by the property rights. A series of case studies of 
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different kinds of actors and their property rights, would be important to “better 
understand the ebb and flow of development opportunities and the contingent nature of 
local development pathways which shape the relative competitiveness of local urban 
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APPENDEX I  
Interviews in Guangzhou 
 
Interviewee 
Name Position Organization 
Venue Date 
Yuan Qifeng Chief Planner Guangzhou Urban 
Planning & Design 
Survey Research Institute
Guangzhou Urban 
Planning & Design 
Survey Research 
Institute 
Mar. 4, 2004 
May.10, 2004 




Mar. 8, 2004 
Wei 
Qingquan 




Mar. 12, 2004 
May. 14, 2004 
Zheng Jing Planner Guangzhou Urban 
Planning & Design 
Survey Research Institute
Guangzhou Urban 
Planning & Design 
Survey Research 
Institute 
May. 17, 2004 
Jul. 6, 2004 
Li Junfu Official  Guangzhou LRHB Guangzhou LRHB Feb. 28, 2004 
Jul. 12, 2004 
Zheng 
Xinmin 
Clerk  Baoli Development. 
Company Ltd. 
West Food Restaurant Jul. 9, 2004 
Gao Lei Clerk People’s Congress Chinese Food Restaurant May. 22, 2004 




Jun. 28, 2004 
Apr. 6, 2005 
Tan Kang Vice director Urban Planning Bureau 
of Liwan District 
Urban Planning Bureau 
of Liwan District 
Oct. 14, 2004 
Mr. Mo & 
Ms. She 




Oct. 14, 2004 
Mr. Shao Chief Manager  Lihua Development Co. Lihua Development Co. Oct. 18, 2004 
Nov. 7, 2004 
Apr. 8, 2005 




Apr. 7, 2005 
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